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Put forward by democratic theory, it is normatively expected that individuals value and 
seek news from diverse viewpoints in order to become good citizens.  In this normative 
assumption, this dissertation identifies two paradoxes of media diversity: First, despite values 
widely ascribed to diversity-seeking, some individuals fail to seek diverse viewpoints (i.e., the 
diversity deficit).  Second, individuals who consume diverse viewpoints do not appear to 
uniformly garner democratic benefits by becoming more politically informed, engaged, and 
capable of deliberation (i.e., there are mixed effects of diverse exposure on democratic 
citizenship).  These paradoxes are explained with two sets of moderators: first, by applying the 
framework of Motivation, Opportunity and Ability (MOA), and second, by expanding on the 
theory of motivated reasoning.  To accomplish this, two waves of survey data from an online 
panel of 1,328 Americans were collected during the 2016 presidential election campaign.  On the 
first paradox, the results suggest that individuals with the right motivation, opportunity, and 
ability successfully translate their diversity values into diverse exposure.  Specifically, people 
with strong diversity-seeking skills who also habitually consume news better-match their 
diversity values with diverse exposure.  Political interest additionally helps individuals actualize 
their diversity values through diverse exposure on social media by following information 
sources.  To explain the second paradox, this dissertation proposes and demonstrates three 
distinct motivations for cross-cutting exposure—defensive dismissal, defensive deliberation and 
balanced deliberation.  For individuals with defensive motivations (who dismiss or counter-argue
xii  
opposing views), diverse exposure suppresses political knowledge, but facilitates political 
participation and diverse news sharing on social media.  In contrast to normative expectations, 
for individuals who are motivated to process opposing views in a balanced fashion, diverse 
exposure suppresses political knowledge, but increases political participation.  These individuals 
with strong balanced deliberation motivations reap primarily deliberative benefits through 
diverse exposure by engaging in more cross-cutting discussion.  Furthermore, sub-group 
analyses suggest that the majority of significant findings take place among partisans.  Despite the 
popular negative narrative, partisans appear to function as good citizens in a few notable aspects.  
Compared to weak or non-partisans, partisans make better use of resources at hand to match their 
professed diversity values with diverse exposure, through which they in turn garner greater 
democratic benefits, including political participation and cross-cutting discussion.  Overall, this 
dissertation argues that to better understand the muddied relationship between diverse exposure 
and democratic citizenship, it is important to consider psychological factors such as individual 
diversity values, different motivations for cross-cutting exposure, and strength of party 
affiliation.  Finally, it makes practical suggestions regarding the ways in which the news 
industry, policymakers, and audiences can work together to build a news media landscape for an 




CHAPTER I.  
Introduction 
 
[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public. 
 
—Hugo Black, Associated Press v. United States, 1945 
 
Today’s 24/7 echo-chamber amplifies the most inflammatory sound bites louder and 
faster than ever before. And it’s also, however, given us unprecedented choice… 
And this can have both a good and bad development for democracy. For if we choose 
only to expose ourselves to opinions and viewpoints that are in line with our own, studies 
suggest that we become more polarized, more set in our ways. That will only reinforce 
and even deepen the political divides in this country. But if we choose to actively seek 
out information that challenges our assumptions and our beliefs, perhaps we can begin to 
understand where the people who disagree with us are coming from.  
 
—Barack Obama, Remarks at the University of Michigan Commencement, 2010 
 
 
Many policymakers, scholars, public intellectuals and politicians share the normative 
assumption that people need to seek diverse viewpoints and information in order to be good 
citizens (AP v. U.S., 1945; Garrett, 2009a; Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015; Mutz, 2006; Napoli, 
1999; Obama, 2010; Pariser, 2011; Prior, 2007; Stroud, 2011; Sunstein, 2009). Diversity-seeking 
values (hereafter: diversity values) find their legal foundation in the tenets of the First 
Amendment, which guarantees press freedom under the assumption that diverse viewpoints and 
information are indispensable for the health of democracy (AP v. U.S., 1945; Kim, 2016). 
Diversity values are effectively captured by the metaphor of the open marketplace of ideas, 
whereby diverse ideas, both agreeable and hateable ones, are available in a competition to reach 
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the ultimate good for a democratic society (Abrams v. U.S., 1919; Neuman, 2010, 2016). 
Scholarly proponents of diversity have widely assumed that citizens who choose to consume 
diverse viewpoints will be well-informed about politics and that this will adequately equip them 
to fulfill their democratic responsibilities (Mutz, 2006; Napoli, 1999; Stroud, 2011). Public 
intellectuals and politicians have joined this chorus, communicating to the general public the 
values and democratic benefits of diverse exposure along with the perils of not seeking diverse 
viewpoints (Obama, 2010; Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2009).  
Achieving diverse exposure in citizens, however, has been challenging under today’s 
media environment. With an abundance of partisan media outlets and audiences who are more 
autonomous and interactive than ever, people may be isolated in “filter bubbles” or “echo 
chambers,” and end up not consuming diverse viewpoints (Jamieson & Cappella, 2009; Pariser, 
2011). A growing body of literature on selective exposure suggests that people tend to expose 
themselves to viewpoints in line with theirs (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & 
Kleinman, 2012; Stroud, 2011), although they do not necessarily avoid opposing views (Garrett, 
2009a; Weeks, Ksiazek, & Holbert, 2016). This pattern of citizens’ rather imbalanced 
information diets was especially pronounced during the 2016 presidential campaign. Trump 
voters primarily relied on Fox News whereas Clinton voters mainly used CNN and MSNBC; both 
groups relied on Facebook as their third main source of election news (Gottfried, Barthel, & 
Mitchell, 2017). When it comes to the degree to which individuals consume diverse viewpoints 
on social media, there are conflicting possibilities. Although social media algorithms may allow 
people to be exposed to slightly more news in line with their own view (Bakshy, Messing, & 
Adamic, 2015), they may be able to access antagonistic and novel perspectives in the process of 
3  
connecting with diverse others including their weak-ties (Brundidge, 2010; Ellison & boyd, 
2013). 
Revisiting the acclamations for diversity-seeking reveals that they have in large part 
sustained on normative grounds. Although widely shared among scholars, policymakers and 
politicians, these normative claims around diversity-seeking rest on the assumed positive 
relationships linking diversity values with subsequent diverse exposure and democratic 
citizenship. That is, scholars presume that people who value diversity will expose themselves to 
diverse viewpoints and information in practice, and that these people will in turn become good 
citizens who are politically informed and are capable of political deliberation and participation, 
as illustrated in Figure 1-1. 
 
Figure 1-1. 
The Normative Pathway to Citizenship 
 
 
The normative claims around diversity values, diverse exposure, and indicators of good 
citizenship, however, have yet to be empirically tested as a whole. That these normative claims 
ultimately presume positive democratic outcomes underscores the value of empirically testing 
them. Prior literature has examined the two assumed relationships (between diversity values and 
exposure, and between diverse exposure and citizenship) separately, and the empirical evidence 
accumulated so far casts some doubt on the two presumed relationships, let alone causality. 
Taking a closer look at the empirical evidence examining diversity values, exposure and 
4  
citizenship reveals two paradoxes as demonstrated in Figure 1-2: First, although individuals 
generally value seeking diversity, for various reasons, some individuals fail to actualize the 
diversity values they profess (i.e., the diversity deficit, Kim & Pasek, 2016a). Second, other 
individuals who do consume diverse viewpoints do not appear to uniformly garner democratic 
benefits by becoming more politically informed, or subsequently more capable of deliberation 
and participation (i.e., there are mixed effects of diverse exposure on citizenship). Collectively, 




Two Paradoxes of Media Diversity 
 
 
Given that the two direct links assumed in the normative pathway to citizenship (Figure 
1-2) do not necessarily exist, this dissertation project aims to address and explain the two 
diversity paradoxes by introducing two sets of moderators: first, by applying the theoretical 
framework of MOA (Motivation, Opportunity, and Ability, Delli Carpini, 2000), and second, by 
expanding on the theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006). I seek to 
understand under what conditions the presumed links among diversity values, exposure and 
citizenship are more or less likely to emerge. The first diversity paradox involves the diversity 
deficit, the disconnect between values ascribed to seeking diversity and citizens’ rather 
imbalanced information diets (Kim & Pasek, 2016a). As scholars, public intellectuals and 
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policymakers advocate seeking diverse viewpoints and information as an important citizenship 
practice, most individuals attribute high values to diverse information-seeking goals. A 
significant portion of individuals, nonetheless, report that they fail to live up to their professed 
diversity values, often selectively exposing themselves to the information consonant to their 
existing political beliefs in practice (Kim & Pasek, 2016a, also see Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; 
Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012; Stroud, 2011).  
Why then do people fail to live up to the diversity values they hold in their everyday 
lives? The first part of this dissertation seeks to explain this diversity deficit in the context of 
both mass media and social media, by applying the framework of MOA (Motivation, 
Opportunity and Ability, Delli Carpini, 2000). Specifically, I examine whether a lack of certain 
motivations, opportunities and abilities does in fact prevent individuals from enacting their 
diversity values in their everyday lives. For example, for individuals who lack the ability to find 
news sources that present diverse viewpoints and information, the association between diversity 
values and practices may be weaker, compared to those who are already proficient in seeking a 
blend of political viewpoints. To put it another way, it is possible that individuals with the right 
motivations, opportunities and ability can better translate their diversity values into diverse 
exposure. 
The second diversity paradox involves the mixed effects of exposure to diverse 
viewpoints on good democratic citizenship. Although scholars have long argued that people who 
seek diversity will be ideal citizens, empirical evidence suggests that these people do not possess 
all attributes of good citizenship (e.g., Mutz, 2006 and Stroud, 2011). To illustrate, individuals 
heavily exposed to both liberal and conservative news sources became more politically 
knowledgeable, but less active, compared to those who mostly consumed one type of content 
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(Kim & Kwak, forthcoming). An interesting pattern was found between exposure to both sides 
and strength of party affiliation. As weak partisans were exposed to more liberal content, they 
consumed more conservative content; however, strong partisans consumed no more conservative 
content when heavily consuming liberal content (Kim & Kwak, forthcoming). Perhaps different 
motivations lead individuals to consume viewpoints from both sides, resulting in dissimilar 
democratic outcomes. Literature on the theory of motivated reasoning (Druckman, 2012; Kunda, 
1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006) would also underscore the importance of different motivations for 
exposure to diverse viewpoints—rather than mere exposure—in predicting democratic 
citizenship.  
When encountering diverse viewpoints and information, individuals may have different 
information-processing motivations (see Kunda, 1990): Some individuals may be motivated to 
reach an accurate (or the best) conclusion. When processing diverse viewpoints and information, 
these individuals will likely not only seek to learn the strong parts of opposing views but also be 
willing to challenge their own views, in order to form a well-informed position. Other 
individuals, on the other hand, may be motivated to defend their existing views. These 
individuals, upon encountering diverse viewpoints and information, will likely discount or 
counter-argue information from opposing views. These individuals may disregard possibly 
relevant and useful information from opposing views in defense of their existing views, thereby 
demonstrating a weak association between diverse exposure and political knowledge. In the 
process, these defensive individuals nonetheless will likely bolster their existing views, and the 
relationship between diverse exposure and political participation could be strong among these 
individuals. That is, depending on individuals’ motivations for processing diverse viewpoints 
and information, the relationships between diverse exposure and citizenship indicators may vary.  
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In explaining the two diversity paradoxes, this dissertation further examines whether 
strength of party affiliation plays a role. Specifically, I investigate whether the influence of the 
two sets of moderators in explaining the two paradoxes varies across different partisan groups. 
For partisans, the distinction between their political party and other political parties is essential to 
who they are. Prior scholarship on social identity theory demonstrates that partisans differentiate 
themselves by favoring their party and derogating other parties (Greene, 2004; Iyengar & 
Weswood, 2015; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In doing so, partisans tend to engage in selective 
exposure and selective judgment of information from different perspectives (e.g., Taber & 
Lodge, 2006), which will likely be relevant to explaining the two paradoxes—the diversity 
deficit as well as the mixed effects of diverse exposure on citizenship.  
 
Figure 1-3. 
Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship 
 
 
Finally, this dissertation project seeks to combine the separate pictures related to the two 
diversity paradoxes. I explicate under what conditions the assumed normative pathway to good 
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citizenship actually emerges as the Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship (Figure 1-3). By 
synthesizing empirical evidence investigating this theoretical model, I seek to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the normative claims around diversity values, exposure and 
indicators of democratic citizenship.  
To accomplish this, I have collected and analyzed a two wave national online survey 
conducted in the United States prior to the 2016 Presidential election. In the following sections, I 
first review relevant literature on the first paradox—the diversity deficit—and introduce a set of 
hypotheses to be tested. I then review literature on the second paradox—the mixed effects of 
diverse exposure on good citizenship that is informed, engaged and deliberative—and advance 
hypotheses. Next, I synthesize the two paradoxes of media diversity and discuss the theoretical 
model, the Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship. In the methods section, I introduce data, 
variables, and analytical approaches. In the results section, I report findings regarding the two 
paradoxes of media diversity. I then discuss the theoretical and normative implications of the 
findings in particular light of the framework of Motivation, Opportunity, and Ability (Delli 
Carpini, 2000), theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006) and the 
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Practical implications for civic education 
programs to promote diverse exposure in people’s everyday lives, media diversity policies, and 
strategies in the news industry are also discussed. It is hoped that the empirical findings of this 
dissertation helpfully guide discussions regarding the importance of diversity-seeking in 
fostering good citizenship as well as diversity-related policymaking and development of 
interventions to improve democratic outcomes. 
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CHAPTER II. 
Diversity Paradox 1: The Diversity Deficit 
 
The Diversity Deficit 
Seeking diverse viewpoints has long been viewed as an important citizenship attribute 
(Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015; Mutz, 2006; Napoli, 1999; Prior, 2007; Stroud, 2011). Many 
scholars, public intellectuals, policymakers and politicians have emphasized that exposure to 
diverse viewpoints is a pre-requisite for an informed, deliberative and engaged citizenry (e.g., 
AP v. U.S., 1945; Obama, 2010; Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2009). As early as 1831 in Democracy 
in America, Alexis de Tocqueville argued that every citizen should consume diverse viewpoints 
and information so that they would be able to appreciate and discriminate between different facts 
and opinions. Diversity norms and values are effectively captured by the metaphor of the open 
marketplace of ideas, whereby diverse ideas, both agreeable and disagreeable ones, compete 
against each other to reach the ultimate good (Abrams v. U.S., 1919; Neuman, 2016). Indeed, 
America’s First Amendment rests on the presumed relationship between the diffusion of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources and the wellbeing of democratic citizens (AP 
v. U.S., 1945). Citizens consuming diverse viewpoints are expected to be politically 
knowledgeable and be capable of effectively participating in politics after deliberating on 
alternative perspectives (Dahl, 2000; Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Fishkin & Luskin, 
2005).
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Despite the importance attributed to seeking diverse viewpoints, a burgeoning body of 
literature on selective exposure suggests that many individuals engage in imbalanced information 
diets (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012; Stroud, 2011), if they 
seek political information at all (Prior, 2007). That is, if individuals choose to seek political 
information, they tend to seek information consistent with their pre-existing viewpoints, although 
they do not necessarily avoid information that challenges those viewpoints (Chaffee, Saphir, 
Graf, Sandvig, & Hahn, 2001; Garrett, 2009a; Garrett, Carnahan, & Lynch, 2013). This apparent 
gap between the values widely ascribed to diversity-seeking and individuals’ imbalanced 
information diets has been empirically established and subsequently termed the diversity deficit 
(Kim & Pasek, 2016a). 
Indeed, a significant portion of individuals views diversity as a value, yet for various 
reasons, they fail to practice the values they profess (Kim & Pasek, 2016a). This group of 
individuals faces the diversity deficit in their everyday lives. Addressing and explaining why 
these citizens do not end up actualizing their diversity values is an important matter to the extent 
that citizens’ deliberation on diverse viewpoints is regarded as a pillar for democracy (Fishkin & 
Luskin, 2005; Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015; Mutz, 2006). A few potential reasons were 
suggested for why some individuals fail to enact their diversity values: They may lack political 
efficacy, time, effort or tools to find diverse viewpoints and information, or they have already 
formed news habits may preclude them from consuming diverse viewpoints (Kim & Pasek, 
2016a).1  
                                                 
1 In a related study on young adults’ news consumption, I conducted focus groups to gain insight into 
whether participants noticed a difference between their news-seeking values and practices and what they 
saw as the causes of the difference (Kim & Pasek, 2016b). The majority of participants indeed recognized 
a gap between their ideal news-seeking patterns and their actual practices. That is, college student 
participants believed that they should rely on trustworthy news sources and diversify sources in an effort 
to combat biases in news. However, many of them primarily encountered news that happened to be on 
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 The first part of this dissertation project thus seeks to empirically explain the gap between 
individuals’ diversity values and their levels of diverse exposure by considering a set of 
moderators. Specifically, a lack of certain resource may prevent individuals from actualizing 
their professed diversity values; the presence of certain resources may strengthen the relationship 
between individuals’ diversity values and practices. Applying the theoretical framework of MOA 
(Motivation, Opportunity and Ability, Delli Carpini, 2000), which theorizes the roots of what 
prompts people to choose to become engaged in public life, this study hypothesizes that 
individuals with certain motivations, opportunities, and abilities will better translate their 
diversity values into diverse exposure (Figure 2-1).  
 
Explaining the Diversity Deficit with Motivation, Opportunity and Ability 
Motivation. Motivation is “goal-directed arousal” (MacInnis et al.,1991, p. 34). In the 
current context, the goal is to seek diverse viewpoints and information. Accordingly, motivation 
is individuals’ desire, readiness, or interest to seek diversity (see MacInnis et al., 1991). As 
motivations for diverse exposure in the context of political news, the current study considers 
political interest and political efficacy (Delli Carpini, 2000).  
Viewed as a stable, intrinsic motivation (Prior, 2010), political interest has been defined 
as a “citizen’s willingness to pay attention to political phenomena at the possible expense of 
                                                 
their social media. Many participants expressed frustration with this gap, and attributed the gap to their 
insufficient time, skills and incentives to adequately keep themselves up to date with news. According to 
the MOA framework, time, skills and incentives respectively belong to opportunities, ability and 
motivations.  
A connected survey study empirically demonstrated that internal political efficacy indeed 
negatively predicted the distance between young adults’ news-seeking values and practices. That is, 
young adults with a stronger belief that they could understand political affairs demonstrated a smaller gap 
between their news-seeking values and traits (Kim & Pasek, 2016b).  
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other topics” (Lupia & Philpot, 2005, p. 1122). Politically interested people follow and care 
about news covering who wins in the election or what is happening in the political process 
(Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Among politically interested individuals, politics is likely 
an important part of their lives; they are already keeping up with news. If some of these 
politically interested individuals value seeking diversity, they will likely seek diverse viewpoints 
in their everyday lives. For individuals who are politically disinterested, however, even if they 
profess that diversity-seeking is important, other priorities in their lives (such as family and 
careers) may precede seeking diverse viewpoints in political news. Hence, it is hypothesized that 
the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure will strengthen for politically 
interested individuals (H1a).  
The second motivation, political efficacy, was originally defined as “the feeling that 
individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process” 
(Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954, p. 187). Research on political efficacy has demonstrated that 
this concept has two dimensions that involve personal political competence (i.e., internal 
efficacy) or a system-oriented sense of efficacy (i.e., external efficacy, Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 
1990; Kenski & Stroud, 2006). People with internal efficacy are confident that they can 
effectively understand and participate in politics while those with external efficacy believe that 
the government will respond to the demands of citizens (Converse, 1972; Balch, 1974). If these 
politically efficacious individuals value seeking diversity, they will readily seek diverse 
viewpoints themselves. People without this sense of political efficacy, however, will likely not 
feel confident enough to actually seek diverse viewpoints, even if they believe that seeking 
diversity is something citizens should do. Thus, I hypothesize that the relationship between 
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diversity values and diverse exposure will be stronger for more politically efficacious individuals 
(H1b).  
 
H1a. As political interest increases, the relationship between diversity values and 
exposure will strengthen. 
H1b. As political efficacy increases, the relationship between diversity values and 
exposure will strengthen. 
 
These hypotheses are also illustrated in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1. 
Predicting the Relationship between Diversity Values and Diverse Exposure with MOA 
(Motivation, Opportunity and Ability)  
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Opportunity. Opportunities to achieve a goal can be restricted by a number of factors, 
including limited time (MacInnis et al.,1991). In the context of seeking diverse viewpoints, some 
individuals who are preoccupied with other important matters (such as work) may conclude that 
they do not have the time for news consumption. These busy individuals may end up not actually 
consuming diverse viewpoints even if they think that citizens should seek diverse viewpoints 
(c.f. Martin & Park, 2003). However, other individuals who are less busy will be able to pursue 
diverse viewpoints in line with their diversity values, thereby demonstrating a strong relationship 
between values and exposure (H2a).  
 
H2a. As perceived busyness decreases, the relationship between diversity values and 
exposure will strengthen. 
 
Opportunities for seeking diverse viewpoints can also be restrained by individuals’ strong 
news habits. Individuals whose news consumption patterns are habitual, meaning that they 
consume news rountinely, automatically, and without thinking (LaRose, 2010; Verplanken & 
Orbell, 2003), may persist in their news-seeking habits even if they notice a gap between their 
habits and their professed diversity values. These individuals with high habitual news use may 
demonstrate a weak relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure. Other 
individuals whose news use is not restrained by habits will be able to seek news from diverse 
viewpoints to match their diversity values. That is, for individuals with low habitual news use, 
the relationship between diversity values and exposure will be strong (H2b).  
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H2b. As habitual news use decreases, the relationship between diversity values and 
exposure will strengthen. 
 
Ability. Ability is necessary in order for citizens to take advantage of opportunities (Delli 
Carpini, 2000). Ability refers to individuals’ skills or proficiencies in performing goal-directed 
tasks (MacInnis et al.,1991). In the current context, individuals who do not have the skills to seek 
diverse viewpoints (on online and traditional media) will not be able to actualize their diversity 
values in practice. Individuals possessing the skills to seek diverse viewpoints, on the other hand, 
will be able to pursue their values and consume diverse viewpoints, thereby reporting a smaller 
gap between their diversity values and diverse exposure (H3a). In a similar manner, individuals 
who are knowledgeable about news sources presenting different political views are expected to 
actually consume diverse viewpoints if they value doing so (H3b). In line with these 
considerations, two hypotheses on ability are advanced: 
 
H3a. As diversity-seeking skills increase, the relationship between diversity values and 
exposure will strengthen. 
H3b. As knowledge of news sources increases, the relationship between diversity values 
and exposure will strengthen. 
 
All six hypotheses attempting to explain the diversity deficit under the MOA framework 





Predicting the Relationship between Diversity Values and Diverse Exposure with MOA 
(Motivation, Opportunity and Ability)  
MOA Moderators Relationship between Values and Exposure 
Motivations Political interest strengthen 
Political efficacy strengthen 
Opportunity Busyness weaken 
Habitual news use weaken 
Ability Diversity-seeking skills strengthen 
Knowledge of news sources strengthen 
 
Social Media Context 
The first part of this dissertation investigates the six hypotheses in two contexts, 
involving overall media (encompassing all available media, such as TV, newspaper, radio, and 
online media) and social media. On social media, there are largely two ways in which users are 
exposed to news and political viewpoints: (a) by following sources including journalists, news 
media and politicians, or (b) from individuals in their social networks. There appears an 
important distinction between these two types of exposure, pertaining to pulling vs. being pushed 
to news and political information (see Hargittai et al., 2012; Neuman, 2016). This distinction is 
in a way similar to exposure that is intentional vs. incidental (see Brundidge, 2010; Kim, 2011). 
On one hand, users get news and political viewpoints from the sources they follow because they 
have intentionally pulled these sources in the first place. On the other hand, getting news or 
personal opinions about politics and the election from individuals in one’s social media network 
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happens in a more incidental fashion for largely two reasons. First, the political information users 
can get from individuals in their network depends on what these individuals choose to share or 
post. Social media users do not necessarily make connections with other individuals based on 
their political views (Brundidge, 2010; Gil de Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011). In fact, on social 
media, not only can users connect with weak-ties who do not necessarily share geographical 
location, social experiences or political viewpoints with them, but they can also form new 
relationships with others based on shared interests (Brundidge, 2010; Ellison & boyd, 2013). 
This offers a possibility where social media users can access novel perspectives in the process of 
connecting with diverse others in an incidental way. However, it is also worth noting the second 
aspect of users’ incidental exposure to information from individuals in their network; social 
media users will not be presented with all the content posted or shared by individuals in their 
network due to algorithmic curation. On social media such as Facebook, algorithms sort news 
content based on people’s political orientation and past viewing behaviors. Facebook Newsfeed, 
pushes users toward slightly more news that is consonant with their own views and away from 
news that is dissonant with their views (Bakshy et al., 2015). As a result, users are presented with 
less diverse content. 
Going back to the current study’s hypotheses: it is predicted that individuals with certain 
motivations, opportunities and abilities will make use of them—perhaps somewhat intentionally 
or actively—to live up to their diversity-values in their diverse exposure. Given that one type of 
exposure to news and political viewpoint on social media tends to be more incidental than the 
other, the hypothesized relationships may vary depending on the type of exposure. It is possible 
that people are able to make better use of resources at hand to actualize their values by following 
sources than by consuming information from individuals in their social network, which likely 
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happens more incidentally. To investigate this possibility, the following research question is 
posed:  
 
RQ1. In the context of social media, do the hypothesized interactive relationships vary by 




Diversity Paradox 2: Mixed Effects of Diverse Exposure on Citizenship 
 
Diverse Exposure and Democratic Citizenship 
 Scholars have long shared the normative assumption that seeking diverse information and 
viewpoints is an essential attribute of democratic citizenship (Kim & Kwak, forthcoming; Mutz, 
2006; Prior, 2007; Stroud, 2011). Citizens must be politically knowledgeable and deliberative to 
be effective participants in the political process, and awareness of diverse viewpoints is essential 
to this process (Dahl, 2000; Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Kim & Pasek, 2016a; Napoli, 
1999). Individuals who consume diverse viewpoints will likely reflect on issues from different 
viewpoints and in turn form more valid conclusions (Arendt, 1968; Habermas, 1989; Mutz, 
2002a). Accordingly, these individuals with diverse exposure are expected to become well-
informed on politics, and be capable of deliberating and participating in political activities (Kim 
& Kwak, forthcoming; Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015; Mutz, 2002a, 2002b; Stroud, 2011). In 
line with these considerations, within the dimensions of citizenship (Neuman, Bimber, & 
Hindman, 2011), this dissertation investigates three distinct citizenship indicators—political 
participation, knowledge, and deliberation—in relation to diverse exposure. 
Despite the normative expectation, empirical evidence on the relationship between 
diverse exposure and democratic citizenship is mixed at best. Individuals who consume diverse 
viewpoints do not appear to uniformly garner democratic benefits by becoming more politically 
informed or engaged (see for instance, Mutz, 2006 and Stroud, 2011), although 
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the operationalization of diverse exposure has been limited. Conceptually, diverse exposure is 
the degree to which people consume a wide range of viewpoints delivered from a wide spectrum 
of sources (Napoli, 1999), possibly including but not limited to exposure to liberal, neutral/mixed 
and conservative viewpoints (Kim & Kwak, forthcoming). In empirical work, however, diverse 
exposure has often been operationalized using measures of exposure to pro-attitudinal or 
counter-attitudinal political views. On the one hand, people’s use of pro-attitudinal partisan 
media generally has been found to be positively related to their political participation. For 
example, exposure to pro-attitudinal sources appears positively related to political participation 
(Dvir-Gvirsman, Garrett, & Tsfati, 2015; Stroud, 2011). Furthermore, the use of pro-attitudinal 
sources has shown to cause an increase in political participation (Dilliplane, 2011; Jamieson & 
Cappella, 2008) although mixed or no effects have also been found (Conroy-Krutz & Moehler, 
2015; Stroud, 2011). Exposure to counter-attitudinal media, on the other hand, generally has 
decreased political participation. Studies have shown that exposure to counter-attitudinal sources 
suppresses political participation (Conroy-Krutz & Moehler, 2015; Dilliplane, 2011), although 
no effects have also been reported (Dvir-Gvirsman, Garrett, & Tsfati, 2015). 
When it comes to political knowledge, pro-attitudinal exposure has been found to be 
positively related to political knowledge (Feldman, Stroud, Bimber, & Wojcieszak, 2013) 
although a negative relationship has also been reported between political knowledge and the use 
of pro-attitudinal media of a conservative orientation (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Kull, 
Ramsay, & Lewis, 2003). Exposure to counter-attitudinal viewpoint, however, appears to be 
positively related to political knowledge in the context of interpersonal communication (Eveland 
& Hively, 2009).  
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The influence of exposure to pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal viewpoints on 
different elements of deliberation has been examined in only a few studies. Defined as a process 
of reasoning and discussion with a “judicious argument, critical listening, and earnest decision 
making” (Gastil, 2000, p. 22), deliberation largely involve three aspects: cognitions, attitudes, 
and behaviors (Park, 2000). One cognitive element of deliberation, namely the awareness of 
rationales for opposing political views, was positively predicted by exposure to counter-
attitudinal viewpoints (Price, Capella, & Nir, 2002), but not by pro-attitudinal exposure (Mutz, 
2002a) in the context of interpersonal communication. Similarly, in the context of mass media, 
strong partisans with more selective exposure to like-minded media were more familiar with 
reinforcing arguments. On the web, more frequent news use was related to increased familiarity 
with reinforcing arguments as well as somewhat increased familiarity with challenging 
arguments (Garrett, 2009a). An attitudinal component of deliberation, tolerance, was positively 
predicted by the awareness of rationales for opposing political views (Mutz, 2002a), suggesting 
the possibility that counter-attitudinal viewpoints may lead to tolerance. A behavioral element of 
deliberation, cross-cutting discussion, was found to be positively predicted by informational 
mobile phone use (Lee & Kwak, 2016) and newspaper and online news use while being 
negatively predicted by cable news use (Borah, Edgerly, Vraga, & Shah, 2013). Cross-cutting 
discussion, however, is yet to be examined in relation to pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal 
exposure. 
Taken together, the empirical evidence accumulated so far is mixed at best, and often 
seems not to be in the direction that is normatively expected. Although citizens who consume 
diverse viewpoints through pro- as well as counter-attitudinal media should be informed and 
engaged, counter-attitudinal exposure appears to suppress political participation while certain 
22  
pro-attitudinal exposure appears negatively related to political knowledge. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that most studies to date have considered exposure to pro- and counter-attitudinal 
content via only one medium, such as TV (Dilliplane, 2011), radio (Conroy-Krutz & Moehler, 
2015; Jamieson & Cappella, 2008), or the web (Dvir-Gvirsman, Garrett, & Tsfati, 2015), except 
for Stroud (2011) which considered TV, radio, newspaper and the web. Also, examining the 
effects of pro- and counter-attitudinal media use on citizenship indicators separately excludes the 
possibility of considering the effects of non-partisan media use (Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015). More 
importantly, by looking at the effects of either pro- or counter-attitudinal media use, the 
normative claim that people who engage in diverse exposure should be good citizens cannot be 
directly tested. For a direct test of the normative claim, this dissertation uses a measure of diverse 
exposure that is in line with its conceptualization in prior scholarship—the degree to which 
people partake of news from diverse viewpoints and sources (Kim & Pasek, 2016a; see also 
Baker, 2008; Einstein, 2004; Napoli, 1999).  
In a similar effort, one study investigated how exposure to liberal and conservative media 
jointly predicted citizenship indicators. Although heavy exposure to both liberal and conservative 
news programs on TV increases politically knowledge, it suppresses political participation (Kim 
& Kwak, forthcoming). In this study, interestingly, while strong partisans consumed no more 
conservative content with greater consumption of liberal content, weak partisans consumed more 
conservative content if they heavily consumed liberal content. This raises questions as to with 
what motivations certain individuals chose to consume viewpoints from both sides. Strong 
partisans might be hearing opposing viewpoints, without necessarily listening to (Dvir-
Gvirsman, 2014), comprehending or evaluating them (Garrett, 2009a). Possibly this is because 
partisans tune into opposing viewpoints with a motivation to bolster their existing views by 
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counter-arguing the opposing side rather than to learn. However, if individuals consume 
opposing viewpoints only with the motivation to reinforce their existing views, the democratic 
benefits of diverse exposure will likely be undermined (Garrett, Carnahan, & Lynch, 2013). 
 
Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure 
Scholarship on the theory of motivated reasoning suggests the possibility that different 
motivations (or goals) behind exposure to diverse viewpoints may lead to different democratic 
benefits rather than the mere diverse exposure uniformly resulting in democratic benefits. 
Literature on motivated reasoning distinguishes an accuracy motivation (i.e., a motivation to 
come up with an accurate or otherwise the best conclusion) from a partisan directional 
motivation (i.e., a motivation to arrive at a particular, desired conclusion) for processing 
information (Druckman, 2012; Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006). With an accuracy 
motivation, individuals are expected to carefully attend to all relevant information and process it 
in an even-handed way (Kunda, 1990). With a directional motivation, individuals will likely 
engage in motivated reasoning: they tend to seek information consistent with their prior beliefs; 
perceive consonant information as stronger; spend more time processing (possibly counter-
arguing or dismissing) counter-attitudinal information; and are accordingly left more certain 
about their prior opinions (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014; Druckman, 2012; Redlawsk, 2002; 
Taber & Lodge, 2006). Individuals, depending on their motivations, will process pro- as well as 
counter-attitudinal information differently, and thus, are likely to garner dissimilar democratic 
benefits from diverse exposure.  
Building upon literature on motivated reasoning, the second part of this dissertation 
proposes three motivations, specifically for processing opposing viewpoints. When encountering 
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opposing viewpoints, individuals may be motivated to 1) readily reject the views opposing to 
theirs without serious engagement (i.e., defensive dismissal); 2) counter-argue opposing views 
and bolster their existing views (i.e., defensive deliberation); or 3) learn the strong parts of 
opposing views to form a well-informed position (i.e., balanced deliberation). The three 
motivations for cross-cutting exposure are compared and contrasted in Table 3-1. 
 
Table 3-1. 
Comparison of Three Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure 
 Defensive Dismissal Defensive Deliberation Balanced Deliberation 
Goal To maintain  existing views 
To strengthen  
existing views To be accurate 




views based on merits 
Anticipation  




The first two motivations, defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation, are related to 
the directional goal in motivated reasoning. Both motivations aim to arrive at a desired 
conclusion that aligns with individuals’ pre-existing beliefs. To achieve this goal, people could 
adopt two different strategies when they encounter opposing viewpoints. First, people can readily 
disregard opposing views without giving them a serious consideration. These people with 
defensive dismissal motivations for cross-cutting exposure do not tune out of opposing views, but 
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choose to be exposed to what the other side has to say. Yet, they will likely laugh at arguments 
of opposing views, which they think do not deserve much of their attention.  
Second, people can counter-argue arguments of opposing views to strengthen their 
existing views. These people with defensive deliberation motivations for cross-cutting exposure 
cognitively engage with information from opposing views only to refute them. They process the 
views that oppose theirs as if they anticipate having a debate with the other side. These 
individuals will primarily look for weaknesses in arguments of opposing views, so that they can 
counter-argue information from opposing views and defend their existing views against any 
challenges (as Garrett, 2009a imply).  
Individuals with balanced deliberation motivations for cross-cutting exposure are in a 
way similar to those with an accuracy goal in the theory of motivated reasoning. As if 
anticipating a political discussion, these individuals process all pieces of information (including 
those consonant as well as dissonant to their views) based on merits, in an even-handed way. 
Their aim is to reach an accurate or well-informed conclusion. For this end, they are not afraid to 
rethink their existing views, and are willing to change their views if necessary.  
Because the three motivations are new measures, research question 2 examines if these 
are indeed distinct motivations that are uniquely predicted by factors related to demographics, 
politics and news media use.   
 





Diverse Exposure, Motivations for Cross-Cutting exposure, and Citizenship 
When it comes to predicting dimensions of citizenship, motivations for cross-cutting 




Predicting the Relationship between Diverse Exposure and Democratic Citizenship with 
Motivations for Cross-Cutting exposure 
 
 
Defensive Dismissal. Individuals with defensive dismissal motivations will readily 
disregard opposing views without effortful thinking. Such individuals are possibly over-
confident with their existing views (regardless of how politically sophisticated they are). Already 
strongly committed to their own views, these individuals with defensive dismissal motivations 
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will likely not see the urgent need to defend their positions against challenges or the value of 
comprehending arguments of opposing views. Rather, upon encountering information from 
opposing views, they will laugh at them or shrug off them. These individuals with high defensive 
dismissal motivations will likely find pleasure in simply confirming their view is right. They do 
not see the value of engaging with opposing views in a substantive way, and do not bother to do 
so.   
When it comes to predicting dimensions of citizenship with individuals’ diverse exposure 
and defensive dismissal motivations, I expect to find that diverse exposure will more negatively 
predict political knowledge (H4a) for individuals with higher levels of defensive dismissal 
motivations. That is, because individuals with high defensive dismissal motivations will likely 
not substantially engage with information from opposing viewpoints at all, t their chance to learn 
from the opposing side would be closed. To readily disregard the opposing views, individuals 
with high defensive dismissal motivations will likely neglect arguments of the opposing side 
including potentially helpful information (Gaines, Kuklinski, Quirk, Peyton, & Verkuilen, 2007; 
Lavine, Johnson, & Steenbergen, 2012). Furthermore, they will be very vulnerable to 
misunderstanding political information. Being overly confident with their existing views, they 
will likely not properly process information from their own views in addition to opposing views. 
Accordingly, for people with higher defensive dismissal motivations, diverse exposure will be 
more negatively related to political knowledge.  
I expect to find a similar relationship between diverse exposure and one indicator of 
deliberative citizenship—cross-cutting discussion (H4b). Upon encountering more diverse 
viewpoints, individuals with high defensive dismissal motivations will not bother to cognitively 
engage with or substantively consider opposing viewpoints. Through more diverse exposure, 
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these individuals will be less likely to see the value of listening to and learning from the 
opposing side and, thus, will be less inclined to discuss politics with others holding political 
views different from them.  
Diverse exposure, however, may foster political participation for this group of individuals 
with higher defensive dismissal motivations (H4c). This is because diverse exposure will likely 
help these individuals—who are likely already over-confident with their existing views—bolster 
their views by dismissing information from opposing views and simply reconfirming their own 
view. Through diverse exposure, these individuals are not reaping deliberative benefits that are 
normatively expected. Because they choose not to reflect on the weaknesses of their own view or 
the strengths of opposing views after diverse exposure, they will only become more certain about 
their own view, possibly becoming more politically participating thereby (Lavine, Johnston, & 
Steenbergen, 2012; Mutz, 2002a).  
Regarding defensive dismissal motivations, the following three hypotheses are advanced 
(also summarized in Table 3-2): 
 
H4a. For individuals with higher defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship 
between diverse exposure and political knowledge will be more strongly negative.  
H4b. For individuals with higher defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship 
between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion will be more strongly negative.  
H4c. For individuals with higher defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship 
between diverse exposure and political participation will be more strongly positive.  
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Defensive Deliberation. Individuals with defensive deliberation motivations would 
process counter-attitudinal information as if they anticipate debates where they must maintain 
their established positions (Garrett, 2009a; Garrett, Carnahan, & Lynch, 2013). That is, in an 
effort to defend their views against any challenges, those individuals will scrutinize arguments of 
opposing views. They will spend a substantial time finding flaws in opposing views and counter-
arguing them. These individuals with defensive deliberation motivations are in a way similar to a 
typical motivated reasoner: In the literature on motivated reasoning, strong partisans tend to 
spend more time and cognitive resources when processing (and very likely counter-arguing) the 
arguments that are incongruent to their own views, compared to processing congruent arguments 
(Redlawsk, 2002; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Since these strong partisans readily accept congruent 
arguments while arguing against incongruent arguments, they tend to evaluate congruent 
arguments more highly than incongruent ones (Druckman, 2012; Taber & Lodge, 2006). These 
biased information processing patterns in defense of individuals’ existing views—which are 
apparently more pronounced among politically sophisticated individuals—lead them to solidify 
their views (Muffert, Chung, Joiner, Waks, & Garst, 2006; Taber & Lodge, 2006).  
 For individuals with higher levels of defensive deliberation motivations, the relationship 
between diverse exposure and political participation will be more strongly positive (H5c). These 
individuals will counter-argue and denigrate opposing views while conveniently accepting 
congruent views. Accordingly, they will likely bolster their existing views, which in turn 
encourages active participation in politics (Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen, 2012; Mutz, 
2002a). In the process of counter-arguing opposing viewpoints after diverse exposure, these 
individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations may pick up a few arguments of the 
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opposing side. This will only lead them to feel the urgent need to defend their views against 
challenges, thereby becoming more active in political activities.  
For individuals with higher defensive deliberation motivations, however, diverse 
exposure will more negatively predict cross-cutting discussion (H5b). With more diverse 
exposure, they will more strongly believe that they have already effectively counter-argued and 
addressed the arguments of opposing views. This belief will likely lead them to not see the value 
of listening to the opposing side through cross-cutting discussion.  
When it comes to predicting political knowledge, there are conflicting possibilities. Upon 
encountering more diverse viewpoints, individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations 
will seriously consider information from opposing views although they are susceptible to 
motivated reasoning. These individuals will generally learn more pieces of information about 
their own views than opposing views (Muffert, Chung, Joiner, Waks, & Garst, 2006) while 
recalling arguments that are predominantly positive toward their own views and that are mostly 
negative toward opposing views (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Although one possibility is that 
individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations gain knowledge mostly through 
selective learning and retention, the other possibility is that they become less knowledgeable 
with more diverse exposure. These individuals who are motivated to deliberate in a defensive 
way might neglect or misinterpret relevant and potentially helpful information mostly from the 
opposing side (Gaines et al., 2007; Lavine, Johnson, & Steenbergen, 2012). Through 
misinterpretation of certain information, they might gain incorrect knowledge. With these 
possibilities, research question 3 is posed: 
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RQ3. For individuals with higher defensive deliberation motivations, is the relationship 
between diverse exposure and political knowledge more strongly negative? 
H5a. For individuals with higher defensive deliberation motivations, the relationship 
between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion will be more strongly negative.  
H5b. For individuals with higher defensive deliberation motivations, the relationship 
between diverse exposure and political participation will be more strongly positive. 
 
Balanced Deliberation. Individuals with balanced deliberation motivations will process 
information in order to form an accurate or well-informed position (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 
2014; Kunda, 1999; Taber & Lodge, 2006) as if they anticipate discussions where they are open 
to changing their existing positions. Upon encountering opposing viewpoints, these individuals 
need not insist on their existing views, but carefully consider opposing and alternative 
viewpoints. Because they seek to reach the best conclusion, they try to learn the strengths or 
merits of the opposing side, and are not afraid to learn the weaknesses of their own side. These 
individuals tend to be free from biased information processing in the context of motivated 
reasoning (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014). These individuals with balanced deliberation 
motivations are also in a way similar to what Mutz (2002a) identified as people with a civil 
orientation toward conflict. This peculiar group of civil people who valued both differences of 
opinion and social harmony—two attributes typically valued in a discussion—benefited the most 
from cross-cutting exposure. They learned more rationales for opposing viewpoints from cross-
cutting exposure than others (Mutz, 2002a).  
All in all, individuals with high balanced deliberation motivations will try to comprehend 
and evaluate arguments of opposing views as well as their own views even-handedly based on 
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merits. In the process, they will likely not only gain political knowledge but also cultivate 
capacity for deliberation by learning legitimate arguments of opposing views. They will likely 
see the value of engaging with opposing views, becoming more willing to listen to others whose 
views oppose their own. Accordingly, I expect to find that diverse exposure will more positively 
predict political knowledge (H6a) and cross-cutting discussion (H6c) for individuals with higher 
balanced deliberation motivations.  
However, because individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivations will become 
more knowledgeable about the weaknesses of their own views as well as the strengths of 
opposing views in the process of deliberation, they may be more ambivalent about their existing 
views (Lavine, 2001; Mutz, 2002b). These individuals are in a way similar to what Lavine, 
Johnson, and Steenbergen (2012) termed ambivalent partisans, who are politically informed, yet 
hesitant to participate in politics, since they feel divided about issues. Thus, I hypothesize that for 
individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivation, diverse exposure will be more 
negatively related to political participation (H6c).  
 
H6a. For individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivations, the relationship 
between diverse exposure and political knowledge will be more strongly positive.  
H6b. For individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivations, the relationship 
between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion will be more strongly positive.  
H6c. For individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivations, the relationship 
between diverse exposure and political participation will be more strongly negative. 
 
 All hypotheses along with research question 3 are summarized in Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-2. 
Predicting the Relationships between Diverse exposure and Democratic Citizenship with 
Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure 






Defensive dismissal - - + 
Defensive deliberation ? - + 
Balanced deliberation + + - 
Note. Positive or negative signs respectively denote that the positive or negative relationship 
between diverse exposure and a given citizenship indicator becomes stronger, as a given 
motivation increases.  
 
Social Media Context: Diverse Sharing  
 On social media, the foundational activities involve sharing content with individuals in 
one’s social network (Ellison & boyd, 2013). In addition to sharing personal news in text, video 
or photos, social media users can share news stories from news outlets rather easily; news 
sharing on social media is essentially one click away, through buttons such as “sharing” or 
“retweeting” (Kümpel, Karnowski, & Keyling, 2015). Defined as “the practice of giving a 
defined set of people access to news content via social media, as by posting or recommending it” 
(Kümpel et al., 2015, p. 2), news sharing has allowed citizens to distribute political information 
in meaningful ways. Not only can social media users endorse (or disapprove) certain news 
stories, they can also re-contextualize, interpret, evaluate or reframe news stories by adding 
comments at the time of news sharing (Choi, 2016).  
Political news sharing has thus been viewed as an expressive form of political 
participation in a number of studies (e.g., Hasell & Weeks, 2016; Lane, Kim, Lee, Weeks, & 
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Kwak, 2017; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). This line of research examined the 
relationship between different types of media used and news sharing behaviors. For example, 
heavy news users who utilize multiple sources are more likely to share news on social media 
(Kümpel et al., 2015). Certain content, including content that is positive (Bakshy, Rosenn, 
Marlow, & Adamic, 2012) or arousing (Berger, 2011) and partisan news inducing anger (Hasell 
& Weeks, 2016) tends to be shared more. When it comes to political viewpoints of news that is 
shared on social media, evidence is mixed: some scholars found that news that match 
individuals’ political orientation was shared more (e.g., An, Quercia, Cha, Gummadi, & 
Crowcroft, 2014; Hasell & Weeks, 2016) whereas others did not (e.g., Morgan, Lampe, & 
Shafiq, 2013). 
What remains as a question is the factors that lead to the degree to which people share 
diverse news on social media (hereafter: diverse sharing). First of all, it is plausible that people 
who consume news from a diversity of views on social media share more diverse news. These 
people can share the diverse news by simply clicking the “share” button. Also, these people are 
possibly getting diverse news not only from followed sources but also from individuals in their 
social network. They thus likely perceive individuals in their social network (i.e., their “imagined 
audience,” Litt, 2012; Marwick & boyd, 2010) to be politically diverse. This perception may lead 
them to share diverse news, which may interest their imagined audience. Prior work on the 
imagined audience demonstrates that it influences how people behave on social media (Litt, 
2012; Marwick & boyd, 2010), including their news sharing behaviors (Coppini, Duncan, 
McLeod, Wise, Bialik, & Wu, 2017). For example, social media users share counter-attitudinal 
news stories if those stories match their imagined audience’s political view (An et al., 2014). 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is advanced: 
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H7. Diverse exposure on social media will be positively related to diverse sharing. 
 
Furthermore, it is possible that depending on the motivations people have for consuming 
opposing viewpoints, they may demonstrate different relationships between diverse exposure and 
diverse sharing. After consuming diverse news on social media, people with defensive 
motivations (both defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation motivations) may share less 
diverse news, by sharing mostly pro-attitudinal news stories. However, it is also possible that 
these defensive people share more diverse news by additionally sharing counter-attitudinal news 
stories (and potentially neutral ones) in a negative or dismissive way (Coppini et al., 2017). 
People with balanced deliberation motivations may also share more diverse news with more 
diverse exposure on social media, for example, to engage in political discussion with individuals 
in their network. They may be interested in sharing their thoughts after deliberating on diverse 
viewpoints, the strengths and weaknesses of their own view as well as opposing views, and in 
hearing what others in their network think. To examine these possibilities, the following research 
question is posed: 
 
RQ4. In the context of social media, how does the relationship between diverse exposure 




Synthesis of Paradoxes 1 & 2: Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship 
 
The Role of Strength of Party Affiliation 
For a more nuanced understanding of the relationships among diversity values, diverse 
exposure, and MOA, it may be important to take into account the strength of party affiliation. 
For strong partisans, compared to weak or non-partisans, the distinction between the political 
party to which they belong (i.e., in-group) and other parties (i.e., out-group) would be critical for 
their self-image and esteem in the context of the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Partisans differentiate themselves by favoring in-group while derogating out-group (Greene, 
2004; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Related to these aims, partisans tend to engage in selective 
engagement and judgement. For one, partisans may selectively expose themselves to news 
sources that are in line with their own views (Hart, Albarracín, Eagly, Brechan, Lindberg, & 
Merrill, 2009; Stroud, 2011) although they do not necessarily avoid opposing views (Garrett, 
2009a), possibly to the extent that they seek to hear the other side (Weeks, Ksiazek, & Holbert, 
2016). Also, partisans may be inclined to selectively judge the validity of information from 
different perspectives in order to favor their in-group and their positions (e.g., Taber & Lodge, 
2006) more than weak or non-partisans. Such distinctiveness of partisans may be relevant to 
explaining the two diversity paradoxes, the diversity deficit as well as the mixed effects of 
diverse exposure on citizenship.  
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It is possible the strength of party affiliation plays a role in explaining the two diversity 
paradoxes such that the influence of the two sets of moderators varies across different partisan 
groups. Yet, it is not entirely certain what role the strength of party affiliation will play. 
Specifically, in explaining the diversity deficit (the relationship between diversity values and 
diverse exposure), the influence of motivations, opportunities and ability may be weaker among 
partisans, compared to weak or non-partisans. Susceptible to selective exposure to like-minded 
sources (Hart et al., 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009; Stroud, 2011), partisans may 
fail to seek out diverse viewpoints although they think it is important to do so. However, this 
may not be the case, because partisans do not necessarily avoid opposing views (Garrett, 2009a; 
Weeks et al., 2016), and furthermore, individuals who are confident that they can defend their 
views from challenges actually prefer like-mined messages less (Albarracín & Mitchell, 2004). 
Also considering that politics and news are fundamentally important to who partisans are 
(Greene, 2004), they might try hard to live up to their diversity values in their everyday news 
diets by making use of the various resources available to them. This means that the influence of 
MOA becomes stronger among partisans in explaining the relationship between diversity values 
and diverse exposure.  
In explaining the relationship between diverse exposure and democratic citizenship 
indicators, it is possible that the influence of defensive motivations (both defensive dismissal and 
defensive deliberation motivations) is pronounced among partisans rather than weak or non-
partisans. This is because partisans are more susceptible to selective judgment of information in 
a way that defends and favors their views (Taber & Lodge, 2006). For weak or non-partisans, 
who tend to be less vulnerable to selective judgment, the influence of balanced motivations may 
be stronger. Given the different possibilities, the following research question is thus posed:  
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RQ5. Do the hypothesized interactive relationships vary by strength of party affiliation? 
 
Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship  
Finally, combining the separate pictures related to the two diversity paradoxes, this 
dissertation discusses the Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship which investigates diversity 
values, exposure and citizenship as a whole (Figure 4-1). With this theoretical model, I seek to 
explicate under what conditions the normative pathway to citizenship (Figure 1-1) actually 
emerges (and apparently does not emerge).  
 
Figure 4-1. 




For example, a case can be established where political interest may effectively moderate 
diversity values and diverse exposure; balanced deliberation motivations effectively moderate 
diverse exposure and political knowledge; and diverse exposure mediates diversity values and 
political knowledge. That is, when political interest and balanced deliberation motivations are 
present, diversity values’ pathway to political knowledge mediated through diverse exposure 
emerges. Similarly, when political interest and balanced deliberation motivations are present, 
diversity values’ pathway to political deliberation mediated through diverse exposure may 
emerge. A different pathway to a participatory citizenry may be established when political 
interest and defensive deliberation motivations are present, and this pathway may be especially 
strong among partisans.  
By synthesizing empirical evidence investigating the media diversity pathway to 
citizenship, I seek to provide a broader picture and a more comprehensive understanding of the 
associations among diversity values, exposure and indicators of democratic citizenship. Only 
then will scholars, policymakers and politicians be able to confidently argue that exposure to 
diverse viewpoints, guided by diversity values, plays an important role in predicting democratic 
citizenship. In light of empirical evidence, scholars will be able to have discussions about what 
values and practices shapes good citizenship and who ideal citizens are; civic educators will then 
be able to design interventions to help guide citizens’ news media consumption practices.  
 
RQ6. Under what conditions does the media diversity pathway to citizenship emerge?
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 The current study analyzes data from a two wave national online survey conducted in the 
United States prior to the Fall Presidential election in 2016. The research company Qualtrics was 
contracted for data collection with their online panel. Quotas were applied for age, gender and 
education to ensure that the sample closely resembled the American population based on U.S. 
Census data (Ryan & Bauman, 2016). Respondents included 48.7% of males and 51.3% of 
females with a mean of 49.5 years of age. In terms of education, 13% held an advanced degree, 
31.2% held a Bachelor's degree, 17.9% held some college or associate degree, 29.6% were high 
school graduates, and 8.4% were high school incompletes. Data for the first wave (W1) were 
collected between October 6 and October 17, 2016. A total of 1,348 individuals completed the 
first wave. Data for the second wave (W2) were collected between November 1 and November 
8, 2016. A total of 895 W1 respondents completed W2 for a retention rate of 66.4%.  
 
Diversity Paradox 1: Predictor Variable 
Diversity values. In order to identify the news-seeking values that respondents held, 
respondents were asked to rate the importance of 17 news-seeking goals (Kim & Pasek, 2016a). 
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Among the 17 news-seeking goals, seven items tapped diverse news-seeking goals (i.e., to get 
news from multiple viewpoints; news from multiple sources; news that balances information 
from every possible point of view; news that reflects the diverse viewpoints within our society; 
news from both liberal and conservative viewpoints; news sources that are owned by different 
owners; and news that weighs different viewpoints against one another) and ten items tapped 
news-seeking goals that are not primarily concerned with diversity (i.e., to get news from highly 
trusted sources; news from sources that just present the facts, without opinions; news from 
sources that put news in context; news from mainstream sources; news from sources that are 
familiar and comfortable; news from viewpoints that you disagree with; news from lesser known 
sources; news from conservative sources; news from viewpoints that you agree with; and news 
from liberal sources).  
For each item, respondents were asked, “Please rate the statements below in terms of 
importance. How important do you think it is for people to get [ITEM].”  Respondents could 
then rate each item as “not at all important,” “a little important,” “somewhat important,” “very 
important,” or “extremely important,” which ranged from 1 to 5. To measure the degree to which 
each respondent valued diverse news-seeking goals, value ratings of seven news-seeking items 
that were diversity-related were averaged together (W1 M = 3.79, SD = .80, α = .88; W2 M = 
3.70, SD = .82, α = .90). 
 
Diversity Paradox 1: Criterion Variables 
 Diverse exposure was measured in two different contexts. First, in the context of overall 
media (encompassing all available media, such as TV, newspaper, radio, and online media), 
diverse exposure (overall media) is a generic measure that closely resembles diverse news-
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seeking values. Additionally, in the contexts of social media, diverse exposure (social media) 
was measured. 
Diverse exposure (overall media). To measure people’s diverse exposure, respondents 
were asked to rate the frequency with which they engaged in the same 17 news-seeking goals as 
in the value questions. Respondents were asked, “When you seek news, how often do you 
[ITEM]?”  Response options were “never,” “rarely,” “sometimes,” “most of the time,” and 
“always,” which were recoded to range from 1 to 5. To measure the degree to which each 
respondent engaged in diverse news-seeking goals, practice ratings of seven news-seeking habits 
that were diversity-related were averaged together (W1 M = 3.45, SD = .82, α = .91; W2 M = 
3.37, SD = .75, α = .90). 
Diverse exposure (social media). To measure individuals’ diverse exposure on social 
media, respondents who reported that they used any social media in the past 30 days were asked, 
“In the past 30 days,2 on social media, how often have you [EXPOSURE ITEM]?” Exposure 
items included: 1) “read or watched news about politics and the election that people shared; 2) 
read or watched news about politics and the election from news sources, journalists or politicians 
that you followed; and 3) read people’s personal opinions about politics and the election.” 
Response options were “never,” “once in the past 30 days,” “2-3 times in the past 30 days,” 
“once per week,” “a few times per week,” and “every day,” ranging from 1 to 6.3   
Respondents who selected all response options but “never” to the three questions then 
read another introduction, “Some news about politics and the election is liberal or Democrat-
                                                 
2 In questions asking behavior frequency in wave 2, “past 14 days” were used as a timeframe. Response options 
included: “never,” “once in the past 14 days,” “2-3 days per week,” “4-6 days per week,” and “every day,” ranging 
from 1 to 6. A shorter timeframe was used in wave 2, because of the short time gap between wave 1 and wave 2. 
While this inconsistency in timeframe is a limitation this dissertation bears, there is no theoretical reason to suspect 
that this inconsistency has led to systematic over- or under-estimations of behavior frequency in respondents.  
3 Responses to these three questions were averaged to measure “exposure frequency,” which was used as a control 
variable for analyses in the context of social media. 
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leaning while other news is conservative or Republican-leaning. Still, other political news is 
neutral or non-partisan.” Respondents were subsequently asked, “You said you [EXPOSURE  
ITEM] on social media in the past 30 days. If you can estimate, what percentage of those 
political news stories/personal opinions that you read or watched is the following? (Total must 
sum to 100.)” They were then presented with three types of content: “liberal or Democrat-
leaning,” “conservative or republican leaning” and “neutral or non-partisan.” Using respondents’ 
estimates, an index of diverse news use was calculated by applying normalized Shannon’s H 
Information Entropy (Boydstun et al., 2014), ranging from 0 to 1: 
 
Diverse exposure =− ∑ ( ) ∗ ln ( ) ln 3  
Where:  represents a content type; and p( ) is the proportion of total attention a given 
content type receives.  
 
Diverse exposure scores were calculated respectively for three types of exposure and 
averaged to measure diverse exposure on social media (W1 M = .58, SD = .30; W2 M = .54, SD 
= .29). Diverse exposure scores from the first and third types of exposure were averaged to 
measure diverse exposure from individuals in social network (W1 M = .59, SD = .30; W2 M 
= .55, SD = .29). Diverse exposure scores from the second type of exposure constituted diverse 
















100 0 0 0 
99 0 1 0.051 
90 10 0 0.2959 
75 25 0 0.5119 
60 40 0 0.6126 
50 50 0 0.6309 
70 20 10 0.7298 
65 25 10 0.7799 
65 20 15 0.8069 
60 30 10 0.8173 
55 35 10 0.8433 
50 40 10 0.8587 
60 20 20 0.865 
50 25 25 0.9464 
45 35 20 0.9545 
40 40 20 0.9602 
40 30 30 0.9912 
35 35 30 0.9977 
34 33 33 0.9999 
 
Diversity Paradox 1: Moderator Variables 
 Political interest. Respondents rated how much they agreed with the following two 
items: “I am interested in politics.” and “I have been interested in the 2016 presidential election.” 
Response options were “not at all,” “a little,” “somewhat,” “very,” and “extremely interested,” 
ranging from 1 to 5. To measure political interest, the degree to which respondents agreed with 
the two items were averaged together (W1 M = 3.54, SD = 1.20, r = .76). 
Political efficacy. Respondents were asked to rate how much they agree with items 
tapping internal and external political efficacy (Kenski & Stroud, 2006). Items included: 
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“Sometimes presidential elections seem so complicated that a person like me can not really 
understand what is going on,” and “People like me have no say over who gets to be president.” 
Response options were “not at all,” “a little,” “somewhat,” “very,” and “extremely,” ranging 
from 1 to 5. The degree to which respondents agreed with the two items were reversed coded and 
averaged together to measure a political efficacy (W1 M = 3.27, SD = 1.06, r = .28). 
Perceived busyness. Respondents were asked how often “do you have too many things 
to do each day to actually get them all done?”, “do you find themselves rushing from place to 
place trying to get to appointments or to get things done?”, and “are you so busy that they miss 
scheduled breaks or rest periods?” (Martin & Park, 2003). Response options were “never,” 
“rarely,” “sometimes,” “often,” and “very often,” ranging from 1 to 5. (W1 M = 2.74, SD = 1.05, 
α = .87) 
Habitual news use. This measure taps the degree to which people habitually get news. 
Respondents were asked to rate how much they agree with items tapping habitual news use, 
dimensions of which include behaviors that are uncontrollable, are done without awareness, and 
are efficient. Four items included: “Reading, watching or listening to news about politics and the 
election is part of my daily routine; something I do automatically; is something I do without 
having to consciously remember; and is something that would require effort not to do (LaRose, 
2010; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). Response options were “not at all,” “a little,” “somewhat,” 
“very,” and “extremely,” ranging from 1 to 5. (W1 M = 3.05, SD = 1.30, α = .93) 
Diversity-seeking skills. This measure evaluates how people perceive their own skills in 
seeking diverse news using traditional and online media. Respondents reported the degree to 
which they agreed with the following items, respectively when they use TV, radio or newspapers 
or social media, and websites and apps to learn about politics and elections. Items included: “It is 
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easy for me to find news sources that present different political viewpoints from one another; and 
I am knowledgeable about news sources that present liberal/conservative views on political 
issues.” Response options were “not at all,” “a little,” “somewhat,” “very,” and “extremely,” 
ranging from 1 to 5. The degree to which respondent agreed with the six items were averaged 
together to measure diversity-seeking skills (W1 M = 3.10, SD = 1.05, α = .91). 
Knowledge of news sources. Respondents were presented with two news sources and 
asked, “News from which news source do you think is leaning toward liberal/conservative?” 
Four pairs or news sources included: The Sean Hannity Show and the Rachel Maddow Show; the 
Thom Hartmann Program and Glenn Beck Radio Program; Slate and the Drudge Report; and 
the New York Times and New York Post. Respondents also had the option to choose “I am not 
sure.” The number of correct responses was counted to construct the news source knowledge 
index, which ranged from 0 to 4 (W1 M = 1.57, SD = 1.44, α = .74). 
 
Diversity Paradox 2: Predictor Variables 
Predictor variables for analyses of the second diversity paradox are identical to the 
criterion variables for analyses of the first diversity paradox: diverse exposure (overall media) 
and diverse exposure (social media). 
 
Diversity Paradox 2: Criterion Variables 
Criterion variables included three indicators of informed, engaged and deliberative 
citizenship: namely, political knowledge, political participation, and cross-cutting discussion. 
Political knowledge. Respondents were asked about the issue/policy positions of two 
presidential candidates from the Republican and the Democratic parties. Respondents were 
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asked, “Below are questions about various policy proposals and candidates. Please tell me 
whether Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump support or oppose each proposal. If you are 
unsure/undecided on a proposal, you may indicate as such.” Four policy proposals were 
considered in each wave: increased background checks for gun sales (W1, W2); raising the 
federal minimum wage (W1, W2); forcing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad out of power (W1); 
approving the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement (W1); changing the business tax 
rate from 35 percent to 15 percent (W2); and pulling out of the current “Iran nuclear deal” (W2). 
Response options included “support,” “oppose,” and “I am not sure.” A composite index ranging 
from 0 to 8 was calculated by counting the correct responses (W1 M = 2.80, SD = 2.51, α = .58; 
W2 M = 3.18, SD = 1.67, α = .85). 
Political participation. Respondents’ levels of political participation were measured by 
combining their offline and online political participation. Regarding offline political 
participation, respondents were first asked, “In the last 30 days, how often did you engage in the 
activities below in person?” Six activities included: attending a political meeting, rally, or 
speech; circulating a petition for a candidate or issue; contacting a public official; posting a 
political sign, banner, button or bumper sticker; volunteering for a political campaign; and 
donating money to a political party, candidate or political action committee. Regarding online 
political participation, respondents were then asked, “In the last 30 days, how often did you 
engage in the activities below online?” Activities included: “watching a political meeting, rally, 
or speech online; circulating an online petition for a candidate or issue; contacting a public 
official online; donating money to a political party, candidate or political action committee 
online; posting my political view or opinion online; and joining a political group online.” 
Response options included: “never,” “once a month,” “two to three times a month,” “every 
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week,” “a few times per week,” and “every day,” which ranged from 1 to 6. A composite index 
was calculated by averaging the twelve participation measures (W1 M = 1.52, SD = .93, α = .95; 
W2 M = 1.39, SD = .85, α = .96). 
Cross-cutting discussion. Respondents reported how many times in the past 30 days 
they talked about politics with someone “who did not share their political views” and “who 
supported a presidential candidate different from them” (see Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015). 
Response options included: “never,” “once a month,” “two to three times a month,” “every 
week,” “a few times per week,” and “every day,” which ranged from 1 to 6. A composite index 
was calculated by averaging the two measures (W1 M = 3.04, SD = 1.54, r = .87; W2 M = 2.67, 
SD = 1.48, r = .86). 
Diverse sharing (social media). Respondents were first asked, “In the past 30 days, how 
many times did you post a link to news about politics or the election?” Response options 
included: “never,” “once a month,” “two to three times a month,” “every week,” “a few times per 
week.” Respondents who selected all response options but “never” to the question were 
subsequently asked, “You said you posted a link to news about politics or the election on social 
media in the past 30 days. If you can estimate, what percentage of those political news 
stories/personal opinions that you posted is the following? (Total must sum to 100.)” They were 
then presented with three types of content: “liberal or Democrat-leaning,” “conservative or 
republican leaning” and “neutral or non-partisan.” Using respondents’ estimates, an index of 
diverse sharing was calculated by applying normalized Shannon’s H Information Entropy 
(Boydstun et al., 2014), ranging from 0 to 1: 
 
Diverse sharing =− ∑ ( ) ∗ ln ( ) ln 3  
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Where:  represents a content type; and p( ) is the proportion of total attention a given 
content type receives.  
 
Diversity Paradox 2: Moderator Variables 
Motivations for cross-cutting exposure. Respondents were asked to rate how much they 
agree with items tapping different motivations for getting news from the opposing side. 
Respondents were first asked, “When you encounter news that opposes your own political view, 
how often do you read, watch or listen to them?” Response options were “never,” “rarely,” 
“sometimes,” “most of the time,” and “always.” Respondents who selected all response options 
but “never” were then be asked: “Please rate how much you agree with the following statements. 
When I encounter news that opposes my own political view, I read, watch or listen to them: 
[items].” Response options included “not at all,” “a little,” “somewhat,” “very much,” and 
“extremely,” which ranged from 1 to 5. 
Defensive dismissal motivations. Five items for defensive dismissal motivations 
included: to dismiss the views that oppose mine; to laugh at the views that oppose my view; to 
confirm that the views opposing mine do not matter to me; to confirm that the views opposing 
mine do not deserve my attention; and to confirm that the views opposing mine are worthless 
(W1 M = 12.73, SD = 5.03, α = .87). 
Defensive deliberation motivations. Five items for defensive deliberation motivations 
included: to defend my view against challenges; to find weaknesses in the views that oppose 
mine; to criticize the views that oppose mine; to find flaws in the views that oppose mine; and to 
strengthen my view against opposing opinions (W1 M = 15.28, SD = 4.81, α = .88). 
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Balanced deliberation motivations. Five items for balanced deliberation motivations 
included: to consider alternative views; to learn about the strengths of the views that oppose 
mine; to refine, challenge or even change my own view if necessary; to form an informed 
position; and to even-handedly understand the views that oppose mine (W1 M = 16.66, SD = 
2.56, α = .88). 
 
Predictor variables for three motivations. For analyses predicting the three motivations 
for cross-cutting exposure (RQ2), the following variables about demographics, politics and 
media were considered. Democratic variables included: sex, age, education and income (see 
Control Variables for more information). For race, respondents were asked to select all that 
apply, and response options included: White or Caucasian, Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin, 
Black or African-American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Pacific Islander, or Asian 
American, and some other race. Respondents were then grouped into: White (if selected “White 
or Caucasian”), Hispanic (if selected “Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin”), Black (if selected 
“Black or African-American”) and other races. 
Political variables included: strength of party affiliation, political interest, and political 
efficacy, and political ideology. For political ideology, response options included: extremely 
liberal (coded as “1”), liberal (“2”), slightly liberal (“3”), moderate (“4”), slightly conservative 
(“5”), conservative (“6”), and extremely conservative (“8”). For strength of party affiliation, 
non-partisans were given “0,” weak partisans were assigned “1,” and partisans were given “2” 
(See Strength of Party Affiliation below for more information).  
Media-related variables included: overall news media use and diversity values. 
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Strength of Party Affiliation  
In terms of strength of party affiliation, respondents were categorized into three groups 
using their party identification: 1) non-partisan (i.e., those who identified themselves as 
independent, N = 314), 2) weak partisan (i.e., those who lean toward Democrat/Republican, N = 
312), and 3) partisan (i.e., those who identified themselves as strong Democrat/Republican or 
Democrat/Republican, N = 655). Respondents who identified themselves as “other” (N=67) were 
excluded in sub-group analyses.  
 
Control Variables 
Demographic control variables included: sex, age, education, and income. For education, 
response options included: none, or grade 1-8, high school incomplete, high school graduate, 
some college or associate’s degree, no 4-year degree, college graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-
year degree), post-graduate training or professional schooling after college (e.g., toward a 
master’s degree or Ph.D.; law or medical). For total family income in 2015, response options 
included: less than $10,000, $10,000 to under $20,000, $20,000 to under $30,000, $30,000 to 
under $40,000, $40,000 to under $50,000, $50,000 to under $75,000, $75,000 to under $100,000, 
$100,000 to under $150,000, and $150,000 or more.  
Additionally, overall news media use was controlled for. Respondents were asked to 
indicate “In the past 14 days, how often have you used the following sources to get news about 
politics or the election?” News sources included television news programs, newspapers, online 
news sources, and talk radio. Response options included: “never,” “once in the past 14 days,” 
“once per week,” “2-3 days per week,” “4-6 days per week,” and “every day,” ranging from 1 to 
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6. To measure overall news media use, the frequency in which respondents got news from the 
four sources were averaged (W1 M = 3.42, SD = 1.11; W2 M = 3.31, SD = 1.14). 
Social media-related control variables included network size and exposure frequency. 
Network size was measured by asking respondents the number of individuals in their network on 
the social media platform they use most frequently (W1 M = 224.70, SD = 270.22, see Ellison, 
Steinfield, & Lampe, 2011). 4 Exposure frequency measured the frequency in which people got 
news and opinions about politics and the election on social media (see footnote 3, W1 M = 3.70, 
SD = 1.64).  
 
Validation: Motivations for Cross-cutting Exposure 
Pilot data. To validate the three motivation measures, a pilot data set was collected 
online among 209 American respondents between July 29 and August 3 through a contract with 
Qualtrics. Quotas were applied for age, gender and education to ensure that the sample closely 
resembles the American population based on U.S. Census data (Ryan & Bauman, 2016).  
Questions. Before being asked about the three motivation measures, respondents were 
first asked, “When you encounter news that oppose your political view, how often do you read, 
watch or listen to them?” Those who did not choose “never,” but chose “rarely,” “sometimes,” 
“most of the time,” or “always” were then asked a follow-up question. These respondents were 
presented with, “When I encounter news that oppose my own political view, I read, watch or 
listen to them,” and then asked to rate the degree to which they agreed with fifteen items that 
were devised to measure the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure (items available in 
                                                 
4 Outliers, responses with values higher than 1,000, were recoded to be 1,000, which was the value at the 95% 
percentile. 
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Tables 6-2 and 6-3). Response options included: “not at all,” “rarely,” “somewhat,” “very 
much,” and “extremely.” 
Additionally, respondents were asked three open-ended questions on how they would feel 
upon encountering the news stories opposing their views, and how they would process the 
opposing stories. These questions were asked to make sure that the motivations most people held 
for consuming opposing information were reasonably captured with the three motivations. 
First, they were asked, “From mass media, including the Internet, TV, radio, newspapers 
and social media, people sometimes encounter news stories that oppose their own political 
views. When you come across news stories that oppose your own political view, how do you feel 
and react?” Before respondents were asked two more open-ended questions in the context of the 
2016 presidential election, respondents were asked “If the election for President were held today, 
and you had to make a choice, for which candidate would you probably vote?” Response options 
included: Donald Trump, the Republican Party; Hillary Clinton, the Democratic Party; Jill Stein, 
the Green Party; Gary Johnson, the Libertarian Party; and I plan not to vote for any of the 
candidates). Respondents were then asked: “Throughout the presidential campaign season, 
people sometimes come across news stories about candidates. When you come across news 
stories that are critical of your favorite candidate, how do you feel and react? Please tell us in the 
space provided below.” and “When you come across news stories that are favorable toward your 
least favorite candidate, how do you feel and react? Please tell us in the space provided below.”  
 
Factor analysis. Principal component analysis with the Oblimin rotation method was 
used to identify factors underlying the fifteen items tapping the three motivations for cross-
cutting exposure. The aim was to check whether three factors tapping the three motivations were 
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indeed identified among the fifteen items. Initial Eigen values indicated that the first two factors 
each accounted for 51.3% and 12.8% of variance. The third factor accounted for 5.4% of total 
variance and had an Eigen value of .81. Below two solutions respectively with two factors (Table 
5-2) and three factors (Table 5-3) are presented.  
With a two factor solution, five items on the bottom that tap balanced deliberation 
motivations are clearly differentiated from other items tapping defensive dismissal and defensive 
deliberation motivations. Three items for defensive deliberation (i.e., to defend my view against 
challenges, to argue the views that oppose mine, and to strengthen the arguments that support my 
view) appeared quite divided with cross-loadings of .3 or above.  
 
Table 5-2. 
Two Factor Solution: Factor Loadings Based on a Principal Components Analysis with Oblimin 
Rotation  
 Factor 1 Factor 2 to dismiss the views that oppose mine .87  to confirm that they do not deserve much  attention .84  to think about how flawed their arguments are .81  to laugh at the views that oppose mine .79  to confirm that they do not matter to me .75  to confirm my view is right .74  to find weaknesses in the views that oppose mine .70  
to defend my view against challenges .61 .30 
to argue the views that oppose mine .55 .31 
to strengthen the arguments that support my view .50 .42 
to consider alternative views .86 
to form an informed position .85 
to evenhandedly understand  the views that oppose mine .83 
to learn the strong parts of the views that oppose mine .81 
to refine, challenge or even change my own view if necessary .77 
Note. Factor loadings <.2 are suppressed. 
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A three factor solution presented a clearer picture. In line with the conceptual 
expectation, it demonstrated that there were three distinct factors underlying the fifteen items, 
each tapping defensive deliberation, balanced deliberation and defensive dismissal motivations. 
This result is considered as a validation of the measures for the three motivations for cross-
cutting exposure. Fourteen items belonged to the factor as expected. However, the first item, “to 
confirm my view is right,” appeared to belong to the defensive deliberation group although it 
was designed to tap defensive dismissal motivations. Additionally, the sixth item, “to argue the 
views that oppose mine,” appeared a bit divided with a primary factor loading of .52 and a cross-
loading of .22. While this three factor solution results were considered as a validation of the 
measures for the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure, I still decided to change the 
wordings of the abovementioned items that were divided between motivations and thus appeared 
slightly problematic in light of respondents’ answers to open-ended questions (more information 
about this in the following section on open-ended questions). 
Specifically, I referred to the languages and expressions that respondents most commonly 
used to tap each motivation in modifying the potentially problematic items. One of the defensive 
dismissal items, “to confirm my view is right,” was modified to “to confirm that the views 
opposing mine are worthless.” Two defensive deliberation items were modified as follows: “to 
argue the views that oppose mine” was changed to “to criticize the views that oppose mine” 
while “to strengthen the arguments that support my view” was changed to “to strengthen my 
view against opposing opinions.” Additionally, one balanced deliberation item, “to learn about 
the strong parts of the views that oppose mine” was modified to “to learn about the strengths of 
the views that oppose mine.” 
56  
Table 5-3. 
Three Factor Solution: Factor Loadings Based on a Principal Components Analysis with 
Oblimin Rotation  
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3   to confirm my view is right .86     to strengthen the arguments that support my 
view .71 .26    to defend my view against challenges .68     to find weaknesses in the views that oppose 
mine .67     to think about how flawed their arguments are .53     to argue the views that oppose mine .52 .22    to consider alternative views -.20 .91    to evenhandedly understand  the views that 
oppose mine  .80    to refine, challenge or even change my own view if 
necessary    .78  
  to learn the strong parts of the views that oppose 
mine  .76    to form an informed position .38 .71 -.26 
  to dismiss the views that oppose mine   .83   to laugh at the views that oppose mine   .77   to confirm that they do not matter to me   .76   to confirm that they do not deserve much 
attention   .67 Note. Factor loadings <.2 are suppressed. 
 
Open-ended questions. Respondents’ answers to the three open-ended questions were 
individually read to ensure that the motivations most people held for cross-cutting exposure were 
reasonably captured with the three proposed motivations. Generally, responses fell under the 
three motivations,5 providing support for the validity of the three motivations. Example 
responses for each motivation are presented in Table 5-4. 
                                                 
5 Some responses touched upon two motivations rather than being confined to only one. This suggests that people’s 
motivations for cross-cutting exposure are not mutually exclusive. This also conceptually makes sense, because 
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Table 5-4. 
Example Responses for the Three Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure 
Motivations Selected Responses 
  Defensive 
Dismissal 
 IT DOES NOT BOTHER ME AT ALL. 
 It makes me laugh. 
 I read them, but I likely will dismiss unfavorable comments as 
irrational. 
 
  Defensive 
Deliberation 
 Identify what is wrong with the ideas. 
 I often read them [news stories from opposing views] to gain insight on 
what the "other side" is thinking.  
 I listen to them [news stories from opposing views] so that I can think 
of reasons in support that greatly outweigh anything critical. 
 
  Balanced 
Deliberation 
 I enjoy hearing both sides of the subject. 
 It is my intention to obtain enough information that would allow me to 
become a lot more informed about the issue. This is true whether or not 
the issue is of one that mirrors my own. In those CONSTANT 
instances when I find information less consistent than my own, I 
absorb (if possible), weigh it for its accuracies, and find a way to 
continue the "thought" and/or conversation. 
 I read them [news stories from opposing views] and try to stay open 
minded. I take in consideration their views and think rationally, trying 
to find what can be countered with my views. 
 
                                                 
defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation motivations share “defensive” characteristics whereas defensive 
deliberation and balanced deliberation motivations share “deliberative” characteristics. 
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Analysis 
To examine H1a through H3c and RQ1 on the first diversity paradox, Model 1 of SPSS 
macro Process, which utilizes ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, was used (Hayes, 2013). 
It is important to note that analyses done in this dissertation project took advantage of the panel 
survey design. Specifically, in testing H1a through H3c, W2 diverse exposure was predicted with 
W1 diversity values while levels of diverse exposure in W1 were controlled for. By taking this 
analytical approach of OLS lagged dependent variable regressions, findings of this dissertation 
demonstrate the degree to which independent variables predict changes in dependent variables 
(Eveland & Thompson, 2006).  
Regarding RQ2 predicting the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure, OLS 
regressions were run. To investigate H4a through H6c along with RQ3 on the second diversity 
paradox, Model 1 of SPSS macro Process was used (Hayes, 2013). Again, W2 citizenship 
indicators were predicted with W1 diverse exposure in the context of overall media while levels 
of citizenship indicators in W1 were controlled for. To investigate H7 and RQ4 in the context of 
social media, W2 diverse sharing was regressed on W1 diverse exposure on social media while 
W1 diverse sharing was controlled for. Model 1 of SPSS macro Process (Hayes, 2013) was used 
to test RQ4. 
Research question 5 on strength of party affiliation was examined through sub-group 
analyses. The aforementioned OLS lagged dependent regression analyses were conducted 






Explaining the Diversity Deficit 
Predicting Diverse Exposure on Overall Media. I first examined whether individuals 
with the right resource (under the framework of Motivation, Opportunity and Ability) were able 
to better-translate their diversity values into diverse exposure than those without the resource in 
the context of overall media exposure. I began the analysis by testing H1, which predicted that as 
motivation—political interest (H1a) or political efficacy (H1b)—increased, the relationship 
between diversity values and diverse exposure would strengthen. Although not hypothesized, I 
first investigated the simple relationship between predictor variables and diverse exposure (W2) 
without the interaction term (Table 6-1, first column). Diversity values in W1 was positively 
related to diverse exposure in W2 (β=.04, SE=.03, p<.01). Among six MOA items, political 
interest (β=.04, SE=.03, p<.05) and diversity skills (β=.10, SE=.03, p<.01) were positively 
related to W2 diverse exposure. I then added the respective interaction terms to the model. 
However, neither political interest (β=.00, SE=.02, p>.10, Table 6-1, second column) nor 
political efficacy (β=.01, SE=.02, p>.10, Table 6-1, third column) interacted with W1 diversity 
values in predicting diverse exposure in W2. As a result, I do not find support for H1a or H1b.  
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Table 6-1. 





















Sex .03(.04) .03(.04) .03(.04) .04(.04) .03(.04) .03(.04) .03(.04) 
Age .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Education .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) 
Income -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.02) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) 
News Use .06(.02)** .05(.02)* .06(.02)** .05(.02)** .05(.02)** .05(.02)** .05(.02)** 
Div. Exp. 
(W1) 
.45(.04)** .45(.04)** .45(.04)** .45(.04)** .45(.04)** .45(.04)** .45(.04)** 
Div. Val. .08(.03)** .10(.07) .05(.08) -.02(.06) .10(.06) -.05(.07) .07(.04)+ 
Political 
Interest 
.05(.03)* .07(.07) .05(.03)* .06(.03)* .05(.03)* .06(.03)* .05(.03)* 
Political 
Efficacy 
-.01(.02) -.01(.02) -.05(.08) -.01(.02) -.01(.02) -.01(.02) -.01(.02) 
News  
Habits 
.02(.02) .02(.02) .02(.02) -.11(.07) .02(.02) .02(.02) .02(.02) 
Busyness .02(.02) .02(.02) .02(.02) .01(.02) .04(.09) .01(.02) .02(.02) 
Diversity 
Skills 
.10(.03)** .10(.03)** .10(.03)** .10(.03)** .10(.03)** -.08(.09) .10(.03)** 
Source 
Know. 
.00(.02) .00(.02) .00(.02) .00(.02) .00(.02) .00 (.02) -.03(.06) 
D. Val. X 
Pol. Int. 
- .00(.02) - - - - - 
D. Val. X 
Pol. Effi. 
- - .01(.02) - - - - 
D. Val. X 
News 
Habits 
- - - .04(.02)* - - - 
D. Val. X 
Busyness 
- - - - -.01(.02) - - 
D. Val. X 
Div. Skills 
- - - - - .05 (.02)* - 
D. Val. X 
Source 
Know. 
- - - - - - .01(.02) 
R-square .475 .475 .476 .478 .475 .478 .476 
N 892       




Overall Media: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure at Values of 
Habitual News Use and Diversity-Seeking Skills 
Habitual News Use Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
1.84 (-1SD) .05 (.03) -.02 to .11 
3.12 (Mean) .09 (.03) .03 to .15 
4.41 (+1SD) .13 (.04) .06 to .21 
Diversity-seeking Skills Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
2.06 (-1SD) .04 (.03) -.02 to .11 
3.09 (Mean) .09 (.03) .03 to .15 
4.12 (+1SD) .14 (.04) .06 to .22 
 
I then tested H2, which predicted that the relationship between diversity values and 
diverse exposure would strengthen, as constraints on opportunity items, (a) busyness and (b) 
habitual news use, decreased. The interaction effect of W1 diversity values and habitual news 
use was found positive and significant for W2 diverse exposure when W1 diverse exposure was 
controlled for (β=.04, SE=.02, p<.05, Table 6-1, fourth column). This relationship holds despite 
accounting for prior levels of diverse exposure in W1, which strongly predicted diverse exposure 
in W2 (β=.45, SE=.04, p<.01). To have a better understanding of the nature of this interaction, 
the Johnson-Neyman technique was used (Hayes, 2013) to probe this relationship at three levels 
of habitual news use (Table 6-2). For individuals with low levels of habitual news use, the 
interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure appeared non-significant, 
as the 95% confidence intervals for the point estimate included zero. For individuals with 
medium (point estimate = .09 (.03), 95% C.I. [.03 to .15]) or high levels of habitual news use 
(point estimate = .13 (.04), 95% C.I. [.06 to .21]), the relationship between diversity values and 
diverse exposure was positive and significant. That is, diversity values in W1 positively 
predicted diverse exposure in W2 among people with medium or high levels of habitual news 
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use. As a result, I found support for H2b. Busyness, nonetheless, was not found to interact with 
W1 diversity values (β=-.01, SE=.02, p>.10, H2a rejected) in predicting W2 diverse exposure. 
Lastly, H3 predicted that the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure 
would strengthen, as ability items, (a) diversity-seeking skills and (b) knowledge of news 
sources, decreased. The interaction effect of W1 diversity values and diversity-seeking skills was 
found positive and significant for W2 diverse exposure (β=.05, SE=.02, p<.05). Probing this 
relationship at three levels of diversity-seeking skills revealed that for individuals with low levels 
of diversity-seeking skills, the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse 
exposure was not significant (Table 6-2). For people with medium (point estimate = .09 (.03), 
95% C.I. [.03 to .15] or high levels of diversity-seeking skills (point estimate = .14 (.04), 95% 
C.I. [.06 to .22]), the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure was 
significant. That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse exposure in W2 
among people with medium or high levels of diversity-seeking skills. This provides evidence in 
support of H3a. However, diversity values in W1 were not found to interact with knowledge of 
news sources (β=.01, SE=.02, p>.10, H3b rejected) in predicting W2 diverse exposure. 
 
Predicting Diverse Exposure on Social Media. I then examined the same set of six 
hypotheses, whether individuals with the right motivation, opportunity and ability were able to 
better-translate their diversity values into diverse exposure than those without them, in the 
context of social media. I began the analysis by testing H1 on motivation, which predicted that as 
political interest (H1a) or political efficacy (H1b) increased, the relationship between diversity 
values and diverse exposure would strengthen. Although not hypothesized, I first investigated the 
simple relationship between predictor variables and diverse exposure on social media (W2) 
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without the interaction term (Table 6-3, first column). Diversity values (W1) appeared unrelated 
to diverse exposure on social media in W2 (β=.01, SE=.02, p>.10). Among six MOA items, 
busyness (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.10) and knowledge of news sources (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.05) were 
positively related to diverse exposure on social media W2. Interestingly, people who reported 
that they were busier engaged in diverse exposure more on social media to a marginal degree. I 
then added the respective interaction terms to the model. However, neither political interest 
(β=.02, SE=.01, p>.10, H1a rejected) nor political efficacy (β=-.01, SE=.01, p>.10, H1b rejected) 
interacted with W1 diversity values in predicting diverse exposure in W2. 
I then examined H2 on opportunities, which predicted that as perceived busyness (H2a) 
or habitual news use (H2b) decreased, the relationship between diversity values and diverse 
exposure on social media would strengthen. The interaction effect of W1 diversity values and 
habitual news use was found positive and significant for W2 diverse exposure (β=.04, SE=.01, 
p<.01, Table 6-3, fourth column). Probing this relationship at three levels of habitual news use 
revealed that for individuals with low or medium levels of habitual news use, the interactive 
relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social media appeared non-
significant (Table 6-4). For individuals with high levels of habitual news use, the relationship 
between diversity values and diverse exposure was significant, point estimate = .05 (.02), 95% 
C.I. [.002 to .09]. That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse exposure on 
social media in W2 among people with high levels of habitual news use (H2b supported). 
Diversity values in W1, nonetheless, were not found to interact with busyness (β=-.01, SE=.01, 



















(Constant) .20(.10)* .48(.20)* .04(.22) .63(.17)** .10(.20) .59(.20)** .22(.12)+ 
Sex -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) 
Age .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Education .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) 
Income .00(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01) -.01(.01) .00(.01) -.01(.01) .00(.01) 
News Use .02(.01) .02(.01) .02(.01) .02(.01) .02(.01) .02(.01) .02(.01) 
Div. Exp. 
(W1) 
.46(.04)** .46(.04)** .46(.04)** .45(.04)** .46(.04)** .46(.04)** .46(.04)** 
Exp. Freq. -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) 
Netw.Size .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Div. Val. .01(.02) -.06(.05) .05(.05) -.10(.04)*
* 
.04(.04) -.01(.05)+ .01(.02) 
Political 
Interest 
-.02(.02) -.09(.05)+ -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) 
Political 
Efficacy 
.00(.01) .00(.01) .05(.06) .00(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01) 
News  
Habits 
-.02(.01) -.02(.01) -.02(.01) -.16(.05)*
* 
-.01(.01) -.02(.01) -.01(.01) 
Busyness .02(.01)+ .02(.01)+ .02(.01)+ .02(.01) .06(.06) .02(.01) .02(.01)+ 
Div. Skills  .01(.02) .01(.02) .01(.02) .01(.02) .01(.02) -.11(.06)+ .01(.02) 
Source 
Know. 
.02(.01)* .02(.01)* .02(.01)+ .02(.01)* .02(.01)+ .02(.01)* .01(.04) 
D. Val. X 
Pol. Int. 
- .02(.01) - - - - - 
D. Val. X 
Pol. Effi. 
- - -.01(.01) - - - - 
D. Val. X 
N. Habits 
- - - .04(.01)** - - - 
D. Val. X 
Busyness 
- - - - -.01(.01) - - 
D. Val. X 
Div. Skills 
- - - - - .03(.01)* - 
D. Val. X 
Source 
Know. 
- - - - - - .00(.01) 
R-square .267 .271 .268 .281 .268 .274 .268 
N 555       





Social Media: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure at Values of 
Habitual News Use and Diversity-Seeking Skills 
Habitual News Use Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
2.02 (-1SD) -.03 (.02) -.07 to .01 
3.27 (Mean) .02 (.02) -.01 to .05 
4.52 (+1SD) .06 (.02) .02 to .11 
Diversity-seeking Skills  Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
2.41 (-1SD) -.01 (.02) -.05 to .03 
3.37 (Mean) .02 (.02) -.01 to .05 
4.34 (+1SD) .05 (.02) .002 to .09 
 
Finally, I tested H3 on ability, which predicted that as diversity seeking skills (H3a) or 
knowledge of news sources (H3b) increased, the relationship between diversity values and 
diverse exposure on social media would strengthen. The results suggested that the interaction 
effect of W1 diversity values and diversity-seeking skills was positive and significant for W2 
diverse exposure on social media (β=.03, SE=.01, p<.05). Probing this relationship at three levels 
of diversity-seeking skills revealed that for individuals with low or medium levels of diversity-
seeking skills, the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure was not 
significant (Table 6-4). For people with high levels of diversity-seeking skills, the interactive 
relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure was significant, point estimate = .05 
(.02), 95% C.I. [.002 to .09]. That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predict diverse 
exposure in W2 among people with medium or high levels of diversity-seeking skills (H3a 
supported). However, diversity values in W1 were not found to interact with knowledge of news 
sources (β=.00, SE=.01, p>.10, H3b rejected) in predicting W2 diverse exposure while W1 
diverse exposure was controlled for. 
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I then turned to RQ1, which asked whether the hypothesized six interactive relationships 
would vary between the two types of diverse exposure on social media: (a) diverse exposure 
from sources that a user followed, and (b) diverse exposure from individuals in a user’s social 
media network. To examine RQ1, I conducted OLS lagged dependent variable regressions, 
predicting diverse exposure respectively (a) from followed sources and (b) from individuals in 
social networks. 
 
Predicting diverse exposure from followed sources. Before investigating RQ1, I first 
looked at the simple relationship between predictor variables and diverse exposure from 
followed sources (W2) without the interaction term (Table 6-5, first column). Diversity values 
(W1) appeared unrelated to diverse exposure from followed sources on social media in W2 
(β=.01, SE=.02, p>.10). None of the six MOA items was statistically significantly related to W2 
diverse exposure from followed sources on social media.  
I then added the interaction terms between W1 diversity values and each of the six MOA 
items to the model. Three interaction terms between diversity values and each of the motivation, 
constraint on opportunity, and ability items were found positive and significant to a marginal 
degree. First, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and political interest was found 
marginally significant for W2 diverse exposure from followed sources when W1 diverse 
exposure from followed sources was controlled for (β=.04, SE=.02, p<.10, Table 6-5, second 
column). Probing this relationship at three levels of political interest revealed that the 
relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure from followed sources was 
significant only for individuals with high levels of political interest, point estimate = .07 (.03), 
95% C.I. [.01 to .14] (Table 6-6). That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted 
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diverse exposure from followed sources in W2 among individuals who were highly politically 
interested.  
Second, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and habitual news use was found 
marginally significant for W2 diverse exposure from followed sources when W1 diverse 
exposure was controlled for (β=.03, SE=.02, p<.10, Table 6-5, fourth column). Probing this 
relationship at three levels of habitual news use revealed that the relationship between diversity 
values and diverse exposure from followed sources was significant only for individuals with high 
levels of habitual news use, point estimate = .07 (.04), 95% C.I. [.003 to .14]. That is, diversity 
values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse exposure from followed sources in W2 among 
individuals who got news highly habitually.  
Third, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and diversity-seeking skills was found 
marginally significant for W2 diverse exposure from followed sources when W1 diverse 
exposure was controlled for (β=.04, SE=.01, p<.10, Table 6-5, sixth column). Probing this 
relationship at three levels of diversity-seeking skills revealed that the interactive relationship 
between diversity values and diverse exposure from followed sources appeared marginally 
significant only for individuals with high levels of diversity-seeking skills, point estimate = .07 
(.03), 95% C.I. [.01 to .14]. That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse 
exposure from followed sources in W2 among individuals who were skillful in diversity-seeking.  
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Table 6-5. 
















(Constant) .19(.15)+ .76(.33)* .35(.33) .62(.28)* -.14(.30) .79(.35)* .27(.18) 
Sex -.02(.02) .02(.03) .02(.04) .02(.03) .02(.03) .02(.03) .02(.04) 
Age .00(.00) .00(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01) -.01(.01) .00(.01) 
Education .01(.01) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Income -.01(.01) .01(.01) .00(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) 















Exp. Freq. -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) 
Netw.Size .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Div. Val. .03(.02) -.12(.08) -.01(.08) -.09(.07) .10(.07) -.12(.08) .00(.03) 
Political 
Interest -.02(.03) -.17(.08)* -.02(.03) -.01(.03) -.02(.03) -.02(.03) -.02(.03) 
Political 
Efficacy -.01(.02) -.01(.02) -.06(.09) -.01(.02) -.01(.02) -.01(.02) -.01(.02) 
News  
Habits -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) 
-
.16(.08)+ -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) 
Busyness .03(.02) .02(.02) .03(.02) .02(.02) .14(.10) .02(.02) .03(.02) 
Div. Skills  .03(.03) .02(.03) .03(.03) .03(.03) .03(.03) -.15(.10) .03(.03) 
Source 
Know. .00(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01) -.05(.06) 
D. Val. X 
Pol. Int. - .04(.02)+ - - - - - 
D. Val. X 
Pol. Effi. - - .01(.02) - - - - 
D. Val. X 
N. Habits - - - .03(.02)+ - - - 
D. Val. X 
Busyness - - - - -.03(.02) - - 
D. Val. X 
Div. Skills - - - - - .04(.01)+ - 
D. Val. X 
Source 
Know. 
- - - - - - 
.01(.01) 
R-square .225 .234 .226 .232 .228 .233 .227 
N 361       




Social Media: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure from Followed 
Sources at Values of Political Interest, Habitual News Use and Diversity-Seeking Skills 
Political Interest Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
3.05 (-1SD) .00 (.03) -.05 to .05 
4.00 (Mean) .04 (.02) -.01 to .08 
4.95 (+1SD) .07 (.03) .01 to .14 
Habitual News Use Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
2.43 (-1SD) .00 (.03) -.06 to .05 
3.56 (Mean) .03 (.02) -.01 to .08 
4.69 (+1SD) .07 (.04) .003 to .14 
Diversity-seeking Skills Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
2.76 (-1SD) .00 (-.03) -.06 to .05 
3.61 (Mean) .04 (.02) -.01 to .08 
4.47 (+1SD) .07 (.03) .01 to .14 
 
 
Predicting diverse exposure from individuals in social networks. Before investigating 
RQ1, I first looked at the simple relationship between predictor variables and diverse exposure 
from individuals in social media networks (W2) without the interaction term (Table 6-7, first 
column). Diversity values (W1) appeared unrelated to diverse exposure from individuals in 
social networks in W2 (β=.01, SE=.02, p>.10). Among six MOA items, only knowledge of news 
sources (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.05) was positively related to W2 diverse exposure from individuals 




Social Media: Predicting Diverse Exposure from Individuals in Social Networks with Diversity 















(Constant) .18(.10)+ .31(.21) .01(.22) .56(.17)** .07(.19) .45(.21)* .17(.12) 
Sex -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.01(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) -.02(.02) 
Age .00(.00) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) 
Education .01(.01) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Income -.01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) 















Exp. Freq. -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) 
Netw.Size .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 














.13(.05)** -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) 
Busyness .02(.01) .02(.01) .02(.01) .02(.01) .06(.01) .02(.01) .02(.01) 




.02(.01) .02(.01)* .02(.01)* .02(.02)* .02(.01)** .03(.04) 




- - - - - 




- - - - 
D. Val. X 
N. Habits 
- - - 
.03(.01)* 
- - - 
D. Val. X 
Busyness 
- - - - 
-.01(.01) 
- - 
D. Val. X 
Div. Skills 
- - - - - 
.02(.01) 
- 
D. Val. X 
Source 
Know. 
- - - - - - 
.00(.00) 
R-square .294 .295 .295 .304 .295 .297 .294 
N 535       





Social Media: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure from Individuals in 
Social Networks at Values of Habitual News Use  
Habitual News Use Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
2.04 (-1SD) -.02 (.02) -.06 to .02 
3.28 (Mean) .02 (.02) -.01 to .05 
4.52 (+1SD) .06 (.02) .01 to .10 
 
 
I then added the interaction terms between W1 diversity values and each of the six MOA 
items to the model in order to examine RQ1. The results suggested that only one interaction term 
between diversity values and habitual news use was positive and significant for W2 diverse 
exposure from individuals in social networks (β=.03, SE=.01, p<.05, Table 6-7, fourth column). 
Probing this relationship at three levels of habitual news use revealed that the relationship 
between diversity values and diverse exposure from individuals in social networks was 
significant only for people with high levels of habitual news use, point estimate = .06 (.02), 95% 
C.I. [.01 to .10] (Table 6-8). That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse 
exposure from individuals in social networks in W2 among people who got news highly 
habitually. 
 
Sub-Group Analyses by the Strength of Party Affiliation. I then turned to RQ5, which 
asked whether the hypothesized six interactive relationships would vary by strength of party 
affiliation. To examine this, two sets of OLS lagged dependent variable regressions, predicting 
diverse exposure on overall media and social media, were run separately among three groups: (a) 
non-partisans, (b) weak partisans, and (c) partisans. 
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 Non-partisans. Among non-partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between 
the predictor variables and diverse exposure in the context of overall media, without any 
interaction terms. Among non-partisans, diversity values in W1 had positive impacts on W2 
diverse exposure (β=.17, SE=.07, p<.05). None of the six MOA items appeared significantly 
related to W2 diverse exposure. When added to the model, none of the interaction terms between 
diversity values and each of the six MOA items appeared significant for W2 diverse exposure.  
I then looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and diverse 
exposure in the context of social media. Among non-partisans, diversity values in W1 was found 
to be unrelated to W2 diverse exposure on social media (β=-.01, SE=.01, p>.10). Among the six 
MOA items, habitual news use (β=-.07, SE=.04, p<.10) and knowledge of news sources (β=.06, 
SE=.02, p<.05) appeared significantly related to diverse exposure on social media. That is, non-
partisans who were less likely to get news habitually, but who knew news source from diverse 
viewpoints ended up engaging in more diverse exposure on social media. 
I then added interaction terms between diversity values and each of the six MOA items to 
the model. Two interaction terms between diversity values and constraints on opportunity items 
were found marginally significant among non-partisans. First, the interaction effect of W1 
diversity values and habitual news use was found positive and marginally significant for W2 
diverse exposure on social media (β=.01, SE=.01, p<.10). Probing this relationship at three levels 
of habitual news use revealed that the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure 
on social media was marginally significant only for non-partisans with low levels of habitual 
news use, point estimate = -.13 (.06), 95% C.I. [-.24 to -.01] (Table 6-9). That is, diversity values 
in W1 likely negatively predicted diverse exposure on social media in W2 among non-partisans 
with low levels of habitual news use.  
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Second, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and busyness was found negative 
and marginally significant for W2 diverse exposure when W1 diverse exposure was controlled 
for (β=-.09, SE=.04, p<.10). Probing this relationship at three levels of busyness revealed that the 
interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social media appeared 
marginally significant only for non-partisans with high levels of perceived busyness, point 
estimate = -.15 (.06), 95% C.I. [-.27 to -.02] (Table 6-9). That is, diversity values in W1 likely 




Non-Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure (Social Media) at 
Values of Busyness and Habitual News Use  
Busyness Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
1.86 (-1SD) .01 (.05) -.10 to .12 
2.79 (Mean) -.07 (.04) -.15 to .01 
3.72 (+1SD) -.15 (.06) -.27 to -.02 
Habitual News Use Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
1.70 (-1SD) -.12 (.06) -.24 to -.01 
2.96 (Mean) -.05 (.04) -.13 to .03 
4.21 (+1SD) .02 (.06) -.10 to .15 
 
Weak partisans. Among weak partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between 
the predictor variables and diverse exposure in the context of overall media, without any 
interaction terms. Among weak partisans, diversity values in W1 did not have an impact on W2 
diverse exposure in the context of overall media (β=.06, SE=.06, p>.10). Among the six MOA 
items, only diversity-seeking skills (β=.13, SE=.06, p<.05) were positively related to diverse 
exposure. When added to the model, none of the interaction terms between diversity values and 
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each of the six MOA items appeared significant for W2 diverse exposure when W1 diverse 
exposure was controlled for.  
I then looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and diverse 
exposure in the context of social media. Among weak partisans, diversity values in W1 did not 
have an impact on W2 diverse exposure on social media (β=.04, SE=.07, p>.10). None of the six 
MOA items was statistically significantly related to diverse exposure on social media. When 
added to the model, none of the interaction terms between diversity values and each of the six 
MOA items appeared significant for W2 diverse exposure on social media. 
Partisans. I began by looking at the simple relationships between the predictor variables 
and diverse exposure in the context of overall media, without any interaction terms. Among 
partisans, diversity values in W1 was found to be unrelated to W2 diverse exposure (β=.05, 
SE=.04, p>.10). Among the six MOA items, political interest (β=.10, SE=.04, p<.01), political 
efficacy (β=-.07, SE=.03, p<.01), and diversity-seeking skills (β=.11, SE=.04, p<.01) were found 
statistically significantly related to W2 diverse exposure. That is, partisans who were more 
politically interested, less politically efficacious and more skillful in finding diverse news, 
engaged in more diverse exposure at a later time. 
I then added interaction terms between diversity values and each of the six MOA items to 
the model. Two interaction terms were found significant among partisans. First, the interaction 
effect of W1 diversity values and habitual news use was found positive and significant for W2 
diverse exposure when W1 diverse exposure was controlled for (β=.06, SE=.03, p<.05). Probing 
this relationship at three levels of habitual news use revealed that the relationship between 
diversity values and diverse exposure was significant only for partisans with high levels of 
habitual news use, point estimate = .13 (.05), 95% C.I. [.02 to .24] (Table 6-10). That is, 
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diversity values in W1 likely positively predict diverse exposure in W2 among partisans with 
high levels of habitual news use.  
Second, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and diversity-seeking skills was 
found significant for W2 diverse exposure (β=.10, SE=.03, p<.01). Probing this relationship at 
three levels of diversity-seeking skills revealed that the interactive relationship between diversity 
values and diverse exposure appeared significant only for partisans with high levels of diversity-
seeking skills, point estimate = .17 (.06), 95% C.I. [.06 to .28] (Table 6-10). That is, diversity 
values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse exposure in W2 among partisans who were 
highly skillful in diversity-seeking. 
 
Table 6-10. 
Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure (Overall Media) at 
Values of Habitual News Use and Diversity-Seeking Skills 
Habitual News Use Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
2.16 (-1SD) -.02 (.05) -.11 to .08 
3.38 (Mean) .06 (.04) -.03 to .14 
4.60 (+1SD) .13 (.05) .02 to .24 
Diversity-seeking Skills Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
2.32 (-1SD) -.03 (.05) -.12 to .07 
3.30 (Mean) .07 (.04) -.01 to .15 
4.28 (+1SD) .17 (.06) .06 to .28 
 
I then looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and diverse 
exposure in the context of social media. Among partisans, diversity values in W1 was found to 
be unrelated to W2 diverse exposure on social media (β=.02, SE=.02, p>.10). None of the six 




Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure (Social Media) at Values 
of Habitual News Use and Diversity-Seeking Skills 
Habitual News Use Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
2.32 (-1SD) -.04 (.03) -.09 to .02 
3.51 (Mean) .03 (.02) -.02 to .07 
4.70 (+1SD) .09 (.03) .03 to .15 
Diversity-seeking Skills Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
2.64 (-1SD) -.02 (.03) -.07 to .04 
3.56 (Mean) .02 (.02) -.02 to .06 
4.49 (+1SD) .06 (.03) -.003 to .12 
 
I then added interaction terms between W1 diversity values and each of the six MOA 
items to the model, predicting W2 diverse exposure on social media. Among partisans, two 
interaction terms were found significant. First, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and 
habitual news use was found positive and significant for W2 diverse exposure on social media 
among partisans (β=.05, SE=.02, p<.01). Probing this relationship at three levels of habitual 
news use revealed that the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social 
media was significant only for partisans with high levels of habitual news use, point estimate = 
.09 (.03), 95% C.I. [.03 to .15] (Table 6-11). That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively 
predicted diverse exposure on social media in W2 among partisans who got news highly 
habitually.  
Second, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and diversity-seeking skills was 
found positive and marginally significant for W2 diverse exposure on social media (β=.04, 
SE=.02, p<.10). Probing this relationship at three levels of diversity-seeking skills revealed that 
the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social media 
appeared marginally significant only for 9.97% of partisans with extremely high diversity-
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seeking skills (higher than 4.92), point estimate = .07 (.04), 95% C.I. [.00 to .15]. That is, 
diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse exposure on social media in W2 among 
partisans who were most skillful in diversity-seeking.  
 
Explaining the Mixed Effects of Diverse Exposure on Citizenship 
Predicting Three Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure. Before turning to a set of 
hypotheses and research questions to explain mixed effects of diverse exposure on citizenship 
indicators with motivations for cross-cutting exposure, I first examined RQ2. Research question 
2 investigated whether three motivations for cross-cutting exposure—(a) defensive dismissal, (b) 
defensive deliberation, and (c) balanced deliberation—are uniquely predicted by a set of factors. 
To examine RQ2, I conducted OLS regression analyses, predicting each motivation with a range 
of factors related to demographics, politics and news media. Demographic factors included sex, 
age (in years), education, income and race while political factors considered political ideology, 
strength of party affiliation, political interest and political efficacy. Also, news use and diversity 
values were included in the analyses. 
First, I analyzed what factors predicted defensive dismissal motivations. Individuals with 
high defensive dismissal motivations expose themselves to news from viewpoints that opposed 
their own political views just to dismiss them. These individuals engage in cross-cutting 
exposure to confirm that opposing viewpoints do not matter to them. The regression results 
demonstrated that defensive dismissal motivations were greater among individuals who were less 
educated (b=-.06, t=-2.01, p<.05, Table 6-12). Other demographic factors such as age, income 
and race appeared not to be related to defensive dismissal motivations to a statistically significant 
degree. In terms of political factors, although political ideology was found not to be related to 
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defensive dismissal motivations, the strength of party affiliation was (b=.14, t=5.24, p<.01). 
Regardless of which political ideology individuals identify with, stronger partisans were likely to 
engage in cross-cutting exposure just to dismiss viewpoints that oppose their own. That is, less 
educated partisans were likely to consume news from opposing viewpoints to dismiss them while 
defending their political views.  
Also, individuals who were more politically interested (b=.20, t=6.33, p<.01), yet were 
less politically efficacious (b=-.22, t=-8.31, p<.01) demonstrated greater defensive dismissal 
motivations. In terms of news media use, individuals who more heavily used news media 
demonstrated greater defensive dismissal motivations (b=.13, t=.13, p<.01), and they thought 
seeking news from diverse viewpoints and sources was important to only a marginal degree 
(b=.05, t=1.72, p<.10). 
Second, I analyzed what factors predicted defensive deliberation motivations. Individuals 
with high defensive deliberation motivations engage in cross-cutting exposure in order to 
strengthen their political views. These individuals consume news from viewpoints that oppose 
their own to find weaknesses in the opposing views as well as to defend their views against any 
challenges. The regression results suggested that defensive deliberation motivations were greater 
among younger individuals (b=-.04, t=-2.11, p<.05, Table 6-12). Other demographic factors such 
as sex, education, income and race appeared not to be related to defensive deliberation 
motivations. In terms of political factors, political ideology (b=.04, t=1.65, p<.10) to a marginal 
degree and the strength of party affiliation was positively related to defensive deliberation 
motivations (b=.12, t=4.77. p<.01). Stronger partisans were more likely to engage in cross-
cutting exposure to counter-argue the arguments of opposing views while strengthening their 
own view; more so if they identified with a conservative ideology. Also, individuals who were 
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more politically interested (b=.32, t=10.68, p<.01), yet less politically efficacious (b=-.13, t=-
5.23, p<.01) demonstrated greater defensive deliberation motivations. News media use-wise, 
individuals who more heavily used news media demonstrated greater defensive deliberation 
motivations (b=.09, t=3.24, p<.05), and they valued seeking news from diverse viewpoints and 
sources to a greater degree (b=.22, t=8.21, p<.01). 
Lastly, I analyzed what factors predicted balanced deliberation motivations. Individuals 
with high balanced deliberation motivations expose themselves to news from viewpoints that 
oppose their own to form an informed position. These individuals are willing to learn the 
strengths of the opposing viewpoints and to accept the weaknesses of their own political views. 
The regression results demonstrated that balanced deliberation motivations were greater among 
younger individuals (b=-.08, t=-3.31, p<.1) and who had higher income (b=.05, t=2.01, p<.1, 
Table 6-12). Other demographic factors including sex, education and race appeared not to be 
related. In terms of political factors, although political ideology was found not to be related to 
balanced deliberation motivations, the strength of party affiliation was in a negative direction 
(b=-.08, t=-3.65, p<.01). That is, younger individuals with weaker party affiliation were likely to 
consume news from opposing viewpoints to learn from them, with the intention to change their 
political views if necessary.  
Also, individuals who were more politically interested (b=.23, t=8.51, p<.01), yet less 
politically efficacious (b=-.12, t=-5.18, p<.01) demonstrated greater balanced deliberation 
motivations. In terms of news media use, individuals who valued seeking news from diverse 
viewpoints and sources to a greater degree demonstrated greater balanced deliberation 
motivations (b=.49, t=20.26, p<.01). However, news media use was found to be unrelated to 
balanced deliberation motivations. 
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Table 6-12. 
Predicting Three Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure with Demographic, Political and 
News Media Variables 




 b t b t b t 
(Constant)  7.74  5.75  5.38 
  Sex -.04 -1.38 -.04 -1.35 .02 .96 
  Age .02 .67 -.06* -2.11 -.08** -3.31 
  Education -.06* -2.01 .00 -.03 .04 1.42 
  Income .02 .56 .01 .21 .05* 2.01 
  White -.05 -1.00 -.03 -.67 -.04 -.85 
  Black .03 .77 .03 .71 -.01 -.15 
  Hispanic .02 .61 .01 .43 -.01 -.40 
  Other Races .00 .03 -.03 -1.01 -.03 -1.02 
  Political Ideology .02 .67 .04+ 1.65 .01 .47 
 Strength of Party 
Affiliation .14** 5.24 .12** 4.77 -.08** -3.65 
  Political Interest .20** 6.33 .32** 10.68 .23** 8.51 
  Political Efficacy -.22** -8.31 -.13** -5.23 -.12** -5.18 
  News Use (W1) .13** 4.53 .09** 3.24 .03 1.34 
  Diversity Values 
(W1) .05+ 1.72 .22** 8.21 .49** 20.26 
  .176  .283  .402  
N 1,348  1,280  1,280  




All in all, the results suggested that three motivations for cross-cutting exposure were 
uniquely predicted by a range of factors that were related to demographics, politics and news 
media (RQ2). 
 
Predicting Political Knowledge. I then turned to H4a, RQ3, and H6a which respectively 
predicted political knowledge with three motivations for cross-cutting exposure along with 
diverse exposure in the context of overall media. I began the analysis by testing H4a, which 
predicted that for individuals with higher defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship 
between W1 diverse exposure and W2 political knowledge will be more strongly negative. For 
this, I regressed W2 politically knowledge on W1 diverse exposure and all three motivations 
while sex, age, education, income, political interest, news media use, diverse news values along 
with W1 political knowledge were controlled for. Although not hypothesized, I first investigated 
the simple relationship between predictor variables and W2 political knowledge (Table 6-13, 
first column). Diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to political knowledge (β=-.15, 
SE=.10 p>.1). Defensive dismissal motivations appeared negatively related to political 
knowledge (β=-.04, p<.05) while defensive deliberation motivations and balanced deliberation 
motivations were found not to be related to political knowledge. 
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Table 6-13. 
Predicting Political Knowledge with Diverse Exposure and Motivations for Cross-Cutting 
Exposure  












(constant) 1.06 (.35)** -.84 (.62) -1.61 (.67)* -2.01 (.70)** 
 Sex -.33 (.10)** -.22 (.10)** -.33 (.10)** -.32 (.10)** 
 Age .01 (.003)** .01 (.00)** .01 (.00)** .01 (.00)** 
 Education .08 (.03)* .08 (.03)* .08 (.03)* .09 (.03)** 
 Income .04 (.02)+ .04 (.02)+ .04 (.02) .04 (.02) 
 Political Interest .23 (.05)** .23 (.05)** .02  (.05)** .23(.05)** 
 News Use .05 (.05) .06 (.05) .07 (.05) .06 (.05) 
 Diverse News 
Value  
.08 (.08) .08 (.08) .07 (.08) .05 (.08) 
Political Know. 
(W1) 
.53 (.03)** .52 (.03)** .52 (.03)** .52 (.03)** 
 Diverse 
Exposure (W1) 
-.15 (.10) .40 (.18)* .67 (.20)* .82 (.22)** 
 Defensive 
Dismissal 
-.04 (.01)* .02 (.05)** -.03 (.01)+ -.03 (.01)* 
 Defensive 
Deliberation 
.03 (.02) .02 (.02)+ .21 (.04)** .02 (.02) 
 Balanced 
Deliberation 
-.02 (.02) -.02 (.02) -.03 (.02)+ .18 (.05)** 
 Div. Exp.  
x Def. Dis. 
-- -.04 (.01)** -- -- 
 Div. Exp. 
x Def. Del. 
-- -- -.05 (.01)** -- 
 Div. Exp.   
x Bal. Del. 
-- -- -- -.06 (.01)** 
  .42 .43 .44 .44 N 892 892 892 892 








Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Political Knowledge at Values of Three Motivations 
for Cross-Cutting Exposure 
Defensive Dismissal Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
7.84 (-1SD) .07 (.11) -.15 to .28 
12.80 (Mean) -.15 (.10) -.33 to .04 
17.76 (+1SD) -.36 (.11) -.57 to -.15 
Defensive Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
10.53 (-1SD) .10 (.11) -.11 to .31 
15.25 (Mean) -.15 (.09) -.34 to .03 
19.97 (+1SD) -.41 (.11) -.62 to -.20 
Balanced Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
12.07 (-1SD) .11 (.11) -.10 to .32 
16.51 (Mean) -.16 (.09) -.34 to .03 
20.96 (+1SD) -.42 (.11) -.63 to -.21 
 
 
To examine H4a, I then added the interaction term between diverse exposure and 
defensive dismissal motivations to the model, which was found negative and statistically 
significant (β=-.04, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-13, second column). To better understand the nature 
of this interaction, the Johnson-Neyman technique was used (Hayes, 2013) to probe this 
relationship at three levels of defensive dismissal motivations (Table 6-14). For individuals with 
weak or moderate defensive dismissal motivations, the interactive relationship between diverse 
exposure and political knowledge appeared non-significant, as the 95% confidence intervals for 
the point estimate included zero. For individuals with high levels of defensive dismissal 
motivations, however, the relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge was 
significant, point estimate = .36 (.11), 95% C.I. [-.57 to -.15]. That is, diverse exposure was 
likely negatively related to political knowledge among people with high levels of defensive 
dismissal motivations. As a result, I found support for H4a.  
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I then turned to RQ3, which asked whether the relationship between diverse exposure and 
political knowledge would be more strongly negative, as defensive deliberation motivations 
increased. When the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation 
motivations was added, it appeared negative and statistically significant (β=-.05, SE=.01, p<.01, 
Table 6-13, third column). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive deliberation 
motivations revealed that only for individuals with high levels of defensive deliberation 
motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge was significant, 
point estimate = .41 (.11), 95% C.I. [-.62 to -.20] (Table 6-14). That is, diverse exposure likely is 
negatively related to political knowledge among people with strong defensive deliberation 
motivations (RQ3). Additionally, the relationship was significant among a small group of 
individuals, 6.73% of respondents, with defensive deliberation motivations lower than 7.82, 
point estimate = .25 (.13), 95% C.I. [.00 to .50]. Diverse exposure likely is positively related to 
political knowledge among people with extremely low levels of defensive deliberation 
motivations. 
Finally, I investigated H6a, which predicted that the relationship between diverse 
exposure and political knowledge would be more strongly positive, as balanced deliberation 
motivations increased. I added the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced 
deliberation motivations, and found that the interaction term appeared negative and statistically 
significant (β=-.06, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-13, fourth column). Probing this relationship at three 
levels of balanced deliberation motivations, however, revealed that only for individuals with 
strong balanced deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political 
knowledge was significant, point estimate = -.42 (.11), 95% C.I. [-.63 to -.21] (Table 6-14). That 
is, diverse exposure likely is negatively related to political knowledge among people with high 
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levels of balanced deliberation motivations (H6a rejected). Additionally, the relationship was 
significant among a small group of individuals, 6.73% of respondents, with balanced deliberation 
motivations lower than 9.85, point estimate = .24 (.12), 95% C.I. [.00 to .48]. Diverse exposure 
likely is positively related to political knowledge among people with extremely low levels of 
balanced deliberation motivations.  
 
Predicting Political Participation. Next, I examined H4c, H5b, and H6c, which 
respectively predicted political participation with three motivations for cross-cutting exposure 
along with diverse exposure in the context of overall media. I began the analysis by testing H4b, 
which predicted that for individuals with higher defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship 
between diverse exposure and political participation will be more strongly positive. For this, I 
regressed W2 political participation on diverse exposure and three motivations for cross-cutting 
exposure while sex, age, education, income, political interest, news media use, diverse news 
values along with W1 political participation were controlled for. Although not hypothesized, I 
first looked at the simple relationships between predictor variables and W2 political 
participation, without any interaction terms (Table 6-15, first column). The results suggested that 
diverse exposure was positively related to political participation (β=.01, SE=.03 p<.05). 
Defensive dismissal motivations appeared positively related to political participation (β=.02, 
SE=.01, p<.01) while defensive deliberation and balanced deliberation motivations were found 
to be unrelated.   
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Table 6-15. 
Predicting Political Participation with Diverse Exposure and Motivations for Cross-Cutting 
Exposure 












(constant) -.07 (.12) .51 (.21)* .41 (.23)+ .57 (.24)* 
 Sex .01 (.01) .00 (.03) .00 (.03) .00 (.03) 
 Age .00 (.00)* .00 (.00)+ .00 (.00)* .00 (.00)* 
 Education .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) 
 Income .00 (.01) .03 (.02) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) 
 Political Interest .00 (.02) .00 (.02) .00 (.02) .00 (.02) 
 News Use .03 (.02) .03 (.02) .03 (.02) .03 (.02) 
 Diverse News 
Value 
-.03 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.03 (.03) -.03 (.03) 
Political Part. 
(W1) 
.78 (.02)** .76 (.02)** .77 (.02)** .77 (.02)** 
 Diverse 
Exposure (W1) 
.01 (.03)* -.09 (.06) -.07 (.07) -.12 (.07)+ 
 Defensive 
Dismissal 
.02 (.01)** -.03 (.02)* .01 (.00)** .01 (.00)** 
 Defensive 
Deliberation 
-.01 (.01) .00 (.01) -.04 (.02)* .01 (.00) 
 Balanced 
Deliberation 
.00 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) -.04 (.02)* 
 Div. Exp. 
X Def. Dis. 
-- .01 (.00)** -- -- 
 Div. Exp. 
x Def. Del. 
-- -- .01 (.00)* -- 
 Div. Exp. 
x Bal. Del. 
-- -- -- .001 (.00)** 
  .69 .69 .69 .69 N 892 892 892 892 








Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Political Participation at Values of Three 
Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure 
 
Defensive Dismissal Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
7.84 (-1SD) .01 (.04) -.06 to .08 
12.80 (Mean) .08 (.03) .01 to .14 
17.76 (+1SD) .14 (.04) .07 to .22 
Defensive Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
10.53 (-1SD) .03 (.04) -.04 to .10 
15.25 (Mean) .08 (.03) .02 to .14 
19.97 (+1SD) .12 (.04) .05 to .20 
Balanced Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
12.10 (-1SD) .02 (.04) -.05 to .09 
16.51 (Mean) .08 (.03) .02 to .14 
20.96 (+1SD) .13 (.04) .06 to .21 
 
 
To test H4c, I then added the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive 
dismissal motivations, which was found positive and statistically significant (β=.01, SE=.00 
p<.01, Table 6-15, second column). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive 
dismissal motivations using the Johnson-Neyman technique demonstrated that the relationship 
between diverse exposure and political participation was significant for individuals with medium 
and high levels of defensive dismissal motivations (Table 6-16). While for individuals with low 
levels of defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political 
participation was not significant, the relationship was positive among those with moderate (point 
estimate = .08 (.03), 95% C.I. [.01 to .14]) or strong defensive dismissal motivations, point 
estimate = .14 (.04), 95% C.I. [.07 to .22]. That is, diverse exposure likely is positively related to 
political participation among people with medium or high levels of defensive dismissal 
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motivations, not among those with low levels of defensive dismissal motivations. Thus, I found 
support for H4c. 
Next, I examined H5b, which predicted that the relationship between diverse exposure 
and political participation would strengthen, as defensive deliberation motivations increased. For 
this, I added the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation 
motivations to the model, which appeared positive and statistically significant (β=.01, SE=.00, 
p<.05, Table 6-15, third column). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive 
deliberation motivations revealed that for individuals with low levels of defensive deliberation 
motivations, the interactive relationship between diverse exposure and political participation 
appeared non-significant (Table 6-16). However, the relationship between diverse exposure and 
political participation was significant for individuals with medium (point estimate = .08 (.03), 
95% C.I. [.02 to .14]) or high levels of defensive deliberation motivations (point estimate = .12 
(.04), 95% C.I. [.05 to .20]). That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to political 
participation among people with medium or high levels of defensive deliberation motivations, 
not among those with low levels of defensive deliberation motivations (H5b supported).  
Finally, I investigated H6c, which predicted that the relationship between diverse 
exposure and political participation would be more strongly negative, as balanced deliberation 
motivations increased. For this, I added the interaction term between diverse exposure and 
balanced deliberation motivations to the model. The interaction term appeared positive and 
statistically significant (β=.001, SE=.00, p<.01, Table 6-15, fourth column). Probing this 
relationship at three levels of balanced deliberation motivations demonstrated that the interactive 
relationship between diverse exposure and political participation appeared non-significant for 
individuals with low levels of balanced deliberation motivations (Table 6-16). The relationship 
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between diverse exposure and political participation was significant among individuals with 
medium (point estimate = .08 (.03), 95% C.I. [.02 to .14]) or high levels balanced deliberation 
motivations (point estimate = .13 (.04), 95% C.I. [.06 to .21]). That is, diverse exposure was 
likely positively related to political participation among people with medium or high levels of 
balanced deliberation motivations, not among those with low levels balanced deliberation 
motivations (H6c rejected).  
 
Predicting Cross-Cutting Discussion. Next, I examined H4b, H5a, and H6b, which 
respectively predicted cross-cutting discussion with three motivations for cross-cutting exposure 
along with diverse exposure in the context of overall media. I began the analysis by testing H4b, 
which predicted that for individuals with higher defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship 
between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion will be more strongly negative. For this, I 
regressed W2 cross-cutting discussion on diverse exposure and three motivations while sex, age, 
education, income, political interest, news media use, diverse news values along with W1 cross-
cutting discussion were controlled for. Although not hypothesized, I first looked at the simple 
relationships between predictor variables and W2 cross-cutting discussion, without any 
interaction terms (Table 6-17, first column). The results demonstrated that diverse exposure 
appeared not statistically significantly related to cross-cutting discussion (β=.08, SE=.07 p>.10). 
None of the three motivations were found to be related to cross-cutting discussion. 
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Table 6-17. 














(constant) -.11 (.27) .22 (..47) .60 (.52) 1.23 (.54)* 
 Sex .00 (.08) .00 (.08) .00 (.08) .00 (.08) 
 Age .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
 Education -.02 (.03) -.02 (.03) -.02 (.03) -.02 (.03) 
 Income .02 (.02) .02 (.02) .02 (.02) .03 (.02) 
 Political Interest .09 (.04)* .09 (.04)* .09 (.04)* .09 (.04)* 
 News Use .12 (.04)** .12 (.04)** .11 (.04)** .11 (.04)** 
 Diverse News 
Value  
-.04 (.06) -.04 (.06) -.04 (.06) -.02 (.06) 
Cross-cutting 
Discussion (W1) 
.55 (.03)** .55 (.03)** .55 (.03)** .55 (.03)** 
 Diverse 
Exposure (W1) 
.08 (.07) -.02 (.14) -.14 (.15) -.34 (.17)* 
 Defensive 
Dismissal 
.00 (.01) -.02 (.04) .00 (.01) -.01 (.01) 
 Defensive 
Deliberation 
-.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.06 (.03)+ -.01 (.01) 
 Balanced 
Deliberation 
.02 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01) -.07 (.03)* 
 Div. Exp.  
x Def. Dis. 
-- .01 (.01) -- -- 
 Div. Exp. 
x Def. Del. 
-- -- -.01 (.01) -- 
 Div. Exp.   
x Bal. Del. 
-- -- -- .03 (.01)** 
  .465 .466 .467 .470 N 892 892 892 892 












Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Cross-Cutting Discussion at Values of Balanced 
Deliberation Motivations 
Balanced Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
12.07 (-1SD) -.03 (.08) -.20 to .13 
16.51 (Mean) .08 (.07) -.06 to .22 
20.96 (+1SD) .19 (.08) .03 to .36 
 
To test H4b, I then added the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive 
dismissal motivations, which did not appear statistically significant (β=.01, SE=.01 p>.10, Table 
6-17, second column). As a result, I found no support for H4b. Next, I examined H5a, which 
predicted that the relationship between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion would be 
strongly negative, as defensive deliberation motivations increased. For this, I added the 
interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation motivations to the model. 
The interaction term, however, did not appear statistically significant (β=-.01, SE=.01, p>.10, 
Table 6-17, third column). Thus, I found no support for H5a.  
Finally, I tested H6b, which predicted that the relationship between diverse exposure and 
cross-cutting discussion would be strongly positive, as balanced deliberation motivations 
increased. For this, I added the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced 
deliberation motivations to the model. The interaction term appeared positive and statistically 
significant (β=.03, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-17, fourth column). Probing this relationship at three 
levels of balanced deliberation motivations demonstrated that the interactive relationship 
between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion appeared non-significant for individuals 
with low or medium levels of balanced deliberation motivations (Table 6-18). The relationship 
between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion was significant among individuals with 
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high levels of balanced deliberation motivations (point estimate = .19 (.08), 95% C.I. [.03 to 
.36]). That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to cross-cutting discussion among 
people with high levels of balanced deliberation motivations, not among those with low or 
medium levels of balanced deliberation motivations. This provides evidence in support of H6b.  
 
Sub-Group Analyses by the Strength of Partisanship. Next, I examined RQ5, which 
asked whether the abovementioned hypothesized interactive relationships (i.e., H4a through H6c 
along with RQ3) would vary by strength of party affiliation.  To examine this, three sets of OLS 
lagged dependent variable regressions, predicting political knowledge, political participation, and 
cross-cutting discussion, were run separately among three groups: (a) non-partisans, (b) weak 
partisans, and (c) partisans. 
 
Non-partisans. Among non-partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between 
the predictor variables and political knowledge, without any interaction terms. Among non-
partisans, diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to political knowledge (β=.08, SE=.21, 
p>.10). None of the three motivations appeared related to political knowledge. When added to 
the model, none of the interaction terms between diverse exposure and the three motivations was 
found statistically significant. 
I then looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and political 
participation, without any interaction terms. Among non-partisans, diverse exposure was found 
to be unrelated to political participation (β=.02, SE=.05, p>.10). None of the three motivations 
appeared related to political participation. When added to the model, none of the interaction term 
between diverse exposure and the three motivations was found statistically significant. 
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Finally, I looked at the simple relationships between the predictors and cross-cutting 
discussion, without any interaction terms. Among non-partisans, diverse exposure was found to 
be unrelated to cross-cutting discussion (β=.04, SE=16, p>.10). None of the three motivations 
appeared related to cross-cutting discussion. When added to the model, none of the interaction 
terms between diverse exposure and the three motivations was found statistically significant. 
 
Weak partisans. Among weak partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between 
the predictor variables and political knowledge, without any interaction terms. Among weak 
partisans, diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to political knowledge (β=.04, SE=.15, 
p>.10). Among the three motivations, only defensive deliberation motivations were negatively 
related to political knowledge to a marginal degree (β=-.06, SE=.03, p<.10).  
 
Table 6-19. 
Weak Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Political Knowledge at Values of 
Defensive Deliberation Motivations 
Defensive Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
10.26 (-1SD) .07 (.25) -.42 to .55 
14.61 (Mean) -.14 (.19) -.51 to .23 
18.97 (+1SD) -.34 (.20) -.73 to .04 
 
 
I then added the interaction terms between diverse exposure and each of the three 
motivations to the model. Only one interaction term, between diverse exposure and defensive 
deliberation motivations, was found negative and statistically significant to a marginal degree 
(β=-.05, SE=.03, p<.10). Probing this relationship at levels of defensive deliberation motivations 
revealed that only for a small group of individuals, 9.18% of respondents, with defensive 
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deliberation motivations higher than 20.83, point estimate = -.44 (.22), 95% C.I. [-.86 to .00] 
(Table 6-19). Diverse exposure was likely negatively associated with political knowledge among 
people with extremely high levels of defensive deliberation motivations. 
 Next, I looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and political 
participation, without interaction terms. Among weak partisans, diverse exposure was found to 
be unrelated to political participation (β=-.01, SE=.04, p>.10). None of the three motivations 
appeared related to political participation. When added to the model, none of the interaction 
terms between diverse exposure and the three motivations was found statistically significant. 
Finally, I looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and cross-
cutting discussion, without interaction terms. Among weak partisans, diverse exposure was 
found to be unrelated to cross-cutting discussion (β=.12, SE=12, p>.10). None of the three 
motivations appeared related to cross-cutting discussion. When added to the model, none of the 
interaction term between diverse exposure and the three motivations was found statistically 
significant. 
 
Partisans. Among partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between the 
predictor variables and political knowledge, without any interaction terms. Among partisans, 
diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to political knowledge (β=-.20, SE=.13, p>.10). 
Among three motivations for cross-cutting exposure, defensive dismissal motivations (β=-.06, 
SE=.02, p<.01) and balanced deliberation motivations (β=-.07, SE=.02, p<.01) were negatively 
related to political knowledge whereas defensive deliberation motivations were positively related 
to a marginal degree (β=.05, SE=.03, p<.10). Notably, W1 diversity values were also positively 
related to political knowledge to a marginal degree (β=.21, SE=.12, p<.10).  
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I then added the interaction terms between diverse exposure and each of the three 
motivations to the model. All three interaction terms were found statistically significant. First, 
the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive dismissal motivations was found 
negative and statistically significant (β=-.05, SE=.02, p<.01, Table 6-20). Probing this 
relationship at three levels of defensive dismissal motivations revealed that only for individuals 
with high levels of defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure 
and political knowledge was significant, point estimate = -.46 (.17), 95% C.I. [-.80 to -.12]. That 
is, diverse exposure was likely negatively related to political knowledge among people with high 
levels of defensive dismissal motivations (RQ3).  
Second, the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation 
motivations was found negative and statistically significant (β=-.05, SE=.02, p<.01, Table 6-20). 
Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive deliberation motivations revealed that only 
for individuals with strong defensive deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse 
exposure and political knowledge was significant, point estimate = -.59 (.17), 95% C.I. [-.92 to -
.26]. That is, diverse exposure was likely negatively associated with political knowledge among 
people with high levels of defensive deliberation motivations. Additionally, the relationship was 
significant among a small group of individuals, 4.20% of respondents, with defensive 
deliberation motivations lower than 7.73, point estimate = .38 (.19), 95% C.I. [.00 to .76]. 
Diverse exposure likely is positively related to political knowledge among people with extremely 
low levels of defensive deliberation motivations. 
Third, the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation 
motivations was found negative and statistically significant (β=-.08, SE=.02, p<.01, Table 6-20). 
Probing this relationship at three levels of balanced deliberation motivations revealed that for 
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individuals with medium (point estimate = -.29 (.14), 95% C.I. [-.57 to -.01]) and high levels of 
balanced deliberation motivations (point estimate = -.65 (.17), 95% C.I. [-.98 to -.32]), the 
relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge was significant. That is, diverse 
exposure was likely negatively associated with political knowledge among people with medium 
or high levels of balanced deliberation motivations. Additionally, the relationship was significant 
among a small group of individuals, 3.98% of respondents, with balanced deliberation 
motivations lower than 8.89, point estimate = .35 (.18), 95% C.I. [.00 to .70]. Diverse exposure 
was likely positively related to political knowledge among people with extremely low levels of 
balanced deliberation motivations. 
 
Table 6-20. 
Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Political Knowledge at Values of Three 
Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure 
Defensive Dismissal Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
8.67 (-1SD) .01 (.16) -.31 to .32 
13.78 (Mean) -.23 (.14) -.51 to .05 
18.90 (+1SD) -.46 (.17) -.80 to -.12 
Defensive Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
11.81 (-1SD) .08 (.15) -.23 to .38 
16.32 (Mean) -.26 (.14) -.54 to .02 
20.83 (+1SD) -.59 (.17) -.92 to -.26 
Balanced Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
11.81 (-1SD) .08 (.15) -.23 to .37 
16.32 (Mean) -.26 (.14) -.57 to -.01 
20.83 (+1SD) -.59 (.17) -.98 to -.32 
 
Next, I looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and political 
participation, without interaction terms. Among partisans, diverse exposure was found to be 
positively related to political participation (β=.12, SE=.06, p<.05). Among the three motivations, 
97  
only defensive dismissal motivations (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.01) were positively related to political 
participation.  
I then added the interaction terms between diverse exposure and each of the three 
motivations to the model. All three interaction terms were found statistically significant. First, 
the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive dismissal motivations was found 
positive and statistically significant (β=.03, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-21). Probing this relationship 
at three levels of defensive dismissal motivations revealed that only for individuals with medium 
(point estimate = .15 (.06), 95% C.I. [.04 to .26]) and high levels of defensive dismissal 
motivations (point estimate = .30 (.07), 95% C.I. [.16 to .43]), the relationship between diverse 
exposure and political participation was significant. That is, diverse exposure was likely 
positively related to political participation among people with medium or high levels of 
defensive dismissal motivations.  
 
Table 6-21. 
Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Political Participation at Values of Three 
Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure 
Defensive Dismissal Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
8.67 (-1SD) .00 (.06) -.13 to .12 
13.78 (Mean) .15 (.06) .04 to .26 
18.90 (+1SD) .29 (.07) .16 to .43 
Defensive Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
11.81 (-1SD)  .00 (.06) -.13 to .12 
16.32 (Mean) .15 (.06) .04 to .25 
20.83 (+1SD) .29 (.07) .16 to .43 
Balanced Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
11.81 (-1SD) .05 (.06) -.07 to .17 
16.32 (Mean) .15 (.06) .04 to .26 





Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Cross-Cutting Discussion at Values of 
Three Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure 
Defensive Dismissal Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
8.67 (-1SD) -.07 (.12) -.30 to .17 
13.78 (Mean) .10 (.11) -.11 to .32 
18.90 (+1SD) .27 (.13) .01 to .53 
Defensive Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
11.81 (-1SD) -.06 (.12) -.30 to .17 
16.32 (Mean) .11 (.11) -.10 to .33 
20.83 (+1SD) .28 (.13) .03 to .54 
Balanced Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
11.81 (-1SD) -.03 (.12) -.26 to .20 
16.32 (Mean) .12 (.11) -.10 to .33 
20.83 (+1SD) .27 (.13) .01 to .52 
 
Second, the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation 
motivations was found positive and statistically significant (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.05, Table 6-21). 
Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive deliberation motivations revealed that only 
for individuals with medium (point estimate = .14 (.06), 95% C.I. [.03 to .25]) and high levels of 
defensive deliberation motivations (point estimate = .22 (.07), 95% C.I. [.09 to .35]), the 
relationship between diverse exposure and political participation was significant. That is, diverse 
exposure was likely positively related to political participation among people with medium or 
and high levels of defensive deliberation motivations. 
Third, the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation 
motivations was found positive and statistically significant (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-21). 
Probing this relationship at three levels of balanced deliberation motivations revealed that only 
for individuals with medium (point estimate = .15 (.06), 95% C.I. [.04 to .26]) and high levels of 
balanced deliberation motivations (point estimate = .25 (.07), 95% C.I. [.12 to .39]), the 
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relationship between diverse exposure and political participation was significant. That is, diverse 
exposure was likely positively related to political participation among people with medium or 
high levels of balanced deliberation motivations. 
Finally, I looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and cross-
cutting discussion, without interaction terms. Among partisans, diverse exposure was found to be 
unrelated to cross-cutting discussion (β=-.13, SE=.09, p>.10). None of the three motivations 
appeared related to cross-cutting discussion.  
I then added the interaction terms between diverse exposure and each of the three 
motivations to the model. All three interaction terms were found statistically significant. First, 
the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive dismissal motivations was found 
positive and statistically significant (β=.03, SE=.01, p<.05, Table 6-22). Probing this relationship 
at three levels of defensive dismissal motivations revealed that only for individuals with high 
levels of defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and cross-
cutting discussion was significant, point estimate = .27 (.13), 95% C.I. [.01 to .53]. That is, 
diverse exposure was likely positively related to cross-cutting discussion among people with 
high levels of defensive dismissal motivations.  
Second, the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation 
motivations was found positive and statistically significant (β=.04, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-22). 
Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive deliberation motivations revealed that only 
for individuals with high levels of defensive deliberation motivations, the relationship between 
diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion was significant, point estimate = .28 (.13), 95% 
C.I. [.03 to .54]. That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to cross-cutting 
discussion among people with high levels of defensive deliberation motivations.  
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Third, the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation 
motivations was found positive and statistically significant (β=.03, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-22). 
Probing this relationship at three levels of balanced deliberation motivations revealed that only 
for individuals with high levels of balanced deliberation motivations, the relationship between 
diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion was significant, point estimate = .27 (.13), 95% 
C.I. [.01 to .52]. That is, diverse exposure was likely positively associated with cross-cutting 
discussion among people with high levels of balanced deliberation motivations.  
 
Predicting Diverse Sharing on Social Media. I turned to H7 and RQ4, which predicted 
diverse sharing on social media. I began the analysis by testing H7, which predicted that diverse 
exposure on social media would be positively related to diverse sharing. For this, I regressed W2 
diverse sharing on W1 diverse exposure on social media while controlling for sex, age, 
education, income, political interest, news media use, diverse news values, social media 
exposure frequency, social media network size, three motivations for cross-cutting exposure 
along with W1 diverse sharing. Diverse exposure was found to be positively related to diverse 
sharing (β=.24, SE=.09 p<.01, Table 6-23, first column). This provides evidence in support of 
H7. Notably, none of the three motivations appeared statistically significantly related to diverse 
sharing on social media. 
Next, I examined RQ4, which asked whether the relationship between diverse exposure 
on social media and diverse sharing would vary by motivations for cross-cutting exposure. For 
this, I added the interaction terms between diverse exposure and each of the three motivations to 
the regression model. Two interaction terms appeared statistically significant. First, the 
interaction term between diverse exposure on social media and defensive dismissal motivations 
was found positive and statistically significant (β=.03, SE=.01 p<.05, Table 6-23, second 
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column). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive dismissal motivations 
demonstrated that the interactive relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing 
appeared non-significant for individuals with low levels of defensive dismissal motivations 
(Table 6-24). The relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing was significant 
among individuals with medium (point estimate = .22 (.09), 95% C.I. [.05 to .39]) or high levels 
of defensive dismissal motivations (point estimate = .37 (.10), 95% C.I. [.17 to .57]). That is, 
diverse exposure was likely positively related to diverse sharing among people with medium or 
high levels of defensive dismissal motivations. 
Second, the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation 
motivations appeared positive and statistically significant (β=.04, SE=.02, p<.05, Table 6-23, 
third column). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive deliberation motivations 
demonstrated that the interactive relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing 
appeared non-significant for individuals with low levels of defensive deliberation motivations 
(Table 6-24). The relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing was significant 
among individuals with medium (point estimate = .25 (.09), 95% C.I. [.08 to .42]) or high levels 
of defensive deliberation motivations (point estimate = .43 (.11), 95% C.I. [.21 to .65]). That is, 
diverse exposure was likely positively associated with diverse sharing among people with 
medium or high levels of defensive deliberation motivations. 
However, the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation 





Social Media: Predicting Diverse Sharing (W2) with Diverse Exposure on Social Media and 
Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure (W1) 








(constant) -.14(.19) .09(.21) .21(.22) .09(.24) 
 Sex -.06(.04) -.06(.04) -.05(.04) -.06(.04) 
 Age .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
 Education -.01(.01) .-.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) 
 Income .01(.01) .00(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) 
 Political Interest .02(.03) .02(.03) .02(.03) .01(.03) 
 News Use .03(.02) .02(.02) .02(.02) .03(.02) 
Diverse Sharing 
(W1) 
.40(.07)** .37(.07)** .36(.07)** .38(.07)** 
SM Exposure 
Freq. 
.01(.02) .02(.02) .02(.02) .02(.02) 
SM Network 
Size 
.00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Diversity Values 
(W1) 
.00(.04) .00(.04) .01(.04) .01(.04) 
 SM Diverse 
Exposure (W1) 
.24(.09)** -.21(.20) -.47(.27) -.21(.30) 
 Defensive 
Dismissal 
.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) -.01(.01) 
 Defensive 
Deliberation 
-.01(.01) -.01(.01) .01(.01) .00(.01) 
 Balanced 
Deliberation 
.01(.01) .01(.01) .01(.01) .00(.01) 
 Div. Exp. 
x Def. Dis. 
-- .03(.01)* -- -- 
 Div. Exp. 
x Def. Del. 
-- -- .04(.02)* -- 
 Div. Exp. 
x Bal. Del. 
-- -- -- .03(.02) 
  .413 .430 .433 .420 N 231    






Social Media: Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Diverse Sharing on Social Media at 
Values of Defensive Dismissal and Defensive Deliberation Motivations 
Defensive Dismissal Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
9.40 (-1SD) .06 (.11) -.16 to .29 
14.69 (Mean) .22 (.09) .05 to .39 
19.98 (+1SD) .37 (.10) .17 to .57 
Defensive Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
13.00 (-1SD) .07 (.11) -.14 to .28 
17.40 (Mean) .25 (.09) .08 to .42 
21.79 (+1SD) .43 (.11) .21 to .65 
 
Sub-group Analyses. I then turned to RQ5, which asked whether the abovementioned 
hypothesized interactive relationships in the social media context would vary by strength of party 
affiliation. To examine this, one OLS lagged dependent variable regression, predicting diverse 
sharing on social media, was run separately among three groups: (a) non-partisans, (b) weak 
partisans, and (c) partisans. 
 
Non-partisans. Among non-partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between 
the predictor variables and diverse sharing on social media. Among non-partisans, when 
interaction terms between diverse exposure on social media and each motivation for cross-
cutting exposure were not included in the analysis, diverse exposure on social media was found 
to be unrelated to diverse sharing (β=.43, SE=.34, p>.10, H7 rejected). None of the three 
motivations appeared related to diverse sharing. When added to the model, none of the 




Weak partisans. Among weak partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between 
the predictor variables and diverse sharing on social media, without any interaction terms. 
Among weak partisans, diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to diverse sharing (β=-.25, 
SE=.20, p>.10, H7 rejected). Notably, diversity values (β=.14, SE=.08, p<.10) were positively 
related to diverse sharing to a marginal degree. None of the three motivations appeared related to 
diverse sharing. When added to the model, none of the interaction terms between diverse 
exposure on social media and the three motivations was found statistically significant. 
 
Partisans. Among partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between the 
predictor variables and diverse sharing on social media, without any interaction terms. Among 
partisans, diverse exposure was found to be positively related to diverse sharing (β=.26, SE=.12, 
p<.05, H7 supported). Among the three motivations, balanced deliberation motivations appeared 
positively related to diverse sharing (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.05).  
I then added the interaction terms between diverse exposure on social media and the three 
motivations for cross-cutting exposure to the model. While the interaction term between diverse 
exposure and defensive dismissal motivations did not appear statistically significant (β=.02, 
SE=.01, p>.10), two other interaction terms were found statistically significant. First, the 
interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation motivations appeared 
positive and statistically significant (β=.05, SE=.02, p<.05, Table 6-25). Probing this relationship 
at three levels of defensive deliberation motivations demonstrated that the interactive 
relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing appeared non-significant for 
individuals with low levels of defensive deliberation motivations. The relationship between 
diverse exposure and diverse sharing was significant among individuals with medium (point 
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estimate = .27 (.12), 95% C.I. [.03 to .50]) or high levels of defensive deliberation motivations 
(point estimate = .45 (.14), 95% C.I. [.17 to .73]). That is, diverse exposure was likely positively 
related to diverse sharing among people with medium or high levels of defensive deliberation 
motivations. 
Second, the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation 
motivations appeared positive and statistically significant to a marginal degree (β=.03, SE=.02, 
p<.10, Table 6-25). Probing this relationship at three levels of balanced deliberation motivations 
demonstrated that the interactive relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing 
appeared non-significant for individuals with low or medium levels of balanced deliberation 
motivations. The relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing was significant 
among individuals with high levels of balanced deliberation motivations (point estimate = .38 
(.14), 95% C.I. .11 to .65]). That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to diverse 
sharing among people with high levels of balanced deliberation motivations. 
 
Table 6-25. 
Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Diverse Sharing on Social Media at 
Values of Defensive Deliberation and Balanced Deliberation Motivations 
Defensive Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
14.32 (-1SD) .08 (.14) -.19 to .36 
18.45 (Mean) .27 (.12) .03 to .50 
22.57 (+1SD) .45 (.14) .17 to .73 
Balanced Deliberation Point Estimate 95% C.I. 
13.65 (-1SD) .10 (.16) -.21 to .40 
18.04 (Mean) .24 (.12) -.002 to .48 




Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship 
Finally, research question 6 examines under what conditions, the media diversity 
pathway to citizenship emerges, by synthesizing all findings from this dissertation project. All 
the significant moderation relationships, between diversity values and diverse exposure, and 
between diverse exposure and citizenship indicators, in the context of both overall media and 
social media, are summarized in the following tables, according to the different groups: (a) all 
respondents, (b) partisans, (c) weak partisans, and (d) non-partisans.  
First, among all respondents, the MOA moderators that were found statistically 
significant in explaining the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure are 
summarized in Table 6-26 (left pane). Also, the motivations for cross-cutting exposure that 
appeared significant in explaining diverse exposure’s relationship with citizenship indicators are 
summarized in Table 6-26 (right pane). In the social media context, the MOA moderators that 
were significant in explaining the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure are 
summarized in Table 6-27 (left pane). The motivations that appeared significant in explaining 
diverse exposure’s relationship with diverse sharing on social media are also summarized in 
Table 6-27 (right pane).  
The results among all respondents demonstrate that individuals who more habitually use 
news and those who are more skilled in finding diverse news sources will better translate their 
diversity values over time into diverse exposure in an overall media environment. If these 
individuals strongly hold any of the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure and engage in 
more diverse exposure, they will become less knowledgeable about politics. If these individuals 
with strong habitual news use and diversity-seeking skills hold very weak defensive deliberation 
or balanced deliberation motivations, they will become more politically knowledgeable through 
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more diverse exposure.  That is, when strong habitual news use (or diversity-seeking skills) 
along with very weak deliberation motivations are present, diversity values’ pathway to political 
knowledge mediated through diverse exposure emerges. 
 To engaged citizenship, a different pathway emerges when individuals with high levels of 
habitual news use (or diversity-seeking skills) strongly hold any of the three motivations for 
cross-cutting exposure and engage in more diverse exposure. To deliberative citizenship, bearing 
cross-cutting discussion, a media diversity pathway emerges when individuals with high levels 
of habitual news use (or diversity-seeking skills) strongly hold balanced deliberation motivations 
and engage in more diverse exposure.  
 On social media, individuals with the right motivation (political interest), opportunity 
(habitual news use) and ability (diversity-seeking skills) better actualize their diversity values in 
diverse exposure. If these individuals hold stronger defensive dismissal or defensive deliberation 
motivations, they will engage in diverse news sharing more through diverse exposure on social 
media.  That is, when the right MOA (i.e., political interest, habitual new use and diversity-
seeking skills) along with strong defensive motivations are present, diversity values’ pathway to 
diverse sharing mediated through diverse exposure emerges on social media. 
 Second, significant results from the partisan group are summarized in Tables 6-28 and 6-
29. Interestingly, the majority of the abovementioned significant results from analyses among all 
respondents were repeatedly found among partisans, not weak or non-partisans. This implies that 
most of the hypothesized relationships were demonstrated among partisans. In Tables 6-28 and 
6-29, findings that were different from those from all respondents in italics.  
 Similar media diversity pathways to informed and engaged citizenship were identified 
among partisans and all respondents. To informed citizenship, a pathway emerges when partisans 
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with high levels of habitual news use (or diversity-seeking skills) hold very weak levels of 
deliberation motivations for cross-cutting exposure and engage in more diverse exposure. To 
engaged citizenship, a pathway emerges when these partisans with high levels of habitual news 
use (or diversity-seeking skills) strongly hold any of the three motivations for cross-cutting 
exposure and engage in more diverse exposure.  
However, to deliberative citizenship, represented with cross-cutting discussion, a media 
diversity pathway emerges when partisans with high levels of habitual news use (or diversity-
seeking skills) strongly hold not just balanced deliberation motivations, but also other two 
defensive motivations, and engage in more diverse exposure. On social media, only habitual new 
use and diversity-seeking skills were helpful in matching diversity values and diverse exposure; 
political interest appeared no more helpful among partisans. Also, in linking diverse exposure 
and diverse sharing, holding defensive dismissal motivations was no more relevant among 
partisans. In the end, partisans with strong habitual new use and diversity-seeking skills along 
with more deliberation motivations (both defensive deliberation and balanced deliberation 
motivations) demonstrated diversity values’ pathway to diverse sharing mediated through diverse 
exposure emerges on social media. 
Among weak or non-partisans, significant findings were rarely reported. This implies that 
the hypothesized relationships linking diversity values, exposure and citizenship seldom take 
place among weak or non-partisans. For weak partisans, non of MOA items were relevant in 
translating diversity values into diverse exposure (Table 6-30). The only significant pattern was 
found among weak partisans with very strong defensive deliberation motivations in that they 
became less politically knowledgeable through more diverse exposure. Lastly, for non-partisans, 
a few significant moderation relationships were found in explaining diverse values and diverse 
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exposure on social media. Non-partisans who were very busy or habitually got news were less 




All Respondents: Predicting Democratic Citizenship  
 








Motivation N/A/ Defensive 
Dismissal 
Strong (-) Moderate, strong 
(+) 
N/A/ 
Opportunity Strong habitual news use (+) Defensive 
Deliberation 
Strong (-) 




Ability Strong diversity-seeking skills (+) Balanced 
Deliberation 
Strong (-) 





Note. Positive (or negative) signs denote that a predictor variable has a positive (or negative) influence on a criterion variable over 




All Respondents: Predicting Diverse Sharing on Social Media  
 
 Diversity Values  Diverse Exposure  Diverse Exposure  Diverse Sharing 
Motivation N/A/ Defensive 
Dismissal 
Moderate, strong (+) 
Opportunity Strong habitual news use (+) Defensive 
Deliberation 
Moderate, strong (+) 
Ability Strong diversity-seeking skills (+) Balanced 
Deliberation 
N/A/ 
Note. Positive (or negative) signs denote that a predictor variable has a positive (or negative) influence on a criterion variable over 




Partisans: Predicting Democratic Citizenship  
 








Motivation N/A/ Defensive 
Dismissal 




Opportunity Strong habitual news use (+) Defensive 
Deliberation 
Strong (-) 





Ability Strong diversity-seeking skills (+) Balanced 
Deliberation 
Moderate, strong (-) 





Note. Positive (or negative) signs denote that a predictor variable has a positive (or negative) influence on a criterion variable over 
time among individuals with strong/moderate/weak levels of a given moderator. Italicized entries denote that findings are different 
from those from all respondents  
 
Table 6-29. 
Partisans: Predicting Diverse Sharing on Social Media 
 
 Diversity Values  Diverse Exposure  Diverse Exposure  Diverse Sharing 
Motivation N/A/ Defensive 
Dismissal 
N/A/ 
Opportunity Strong habitual news use (+) Defensive 
Deliberation 
Moderate, strong (+) 
Ability Strong diversity-seeking skills (+) Balanced 
Deliberation 
Strong (+) 
Note. Positive (or negative) signs denote that a predictor variable has a positive (or negative) influence on a criterion variable over 
time among individuals with strong/moderate/weak levels of a given moderator. Italicized entries denote that findings are different 
from those from all respondents  
112  
Table 6-30. 
Weak Partisans: Predicting Democratic Citizenship 
 








Motivation N/A/ Defensive 
Dismissal 
N/A/ N/A/ N/A/ 
Opportunity N/A/ Defensive 
Deliberation 
Very strong (-) N/A/ N/A/ 
Ability N/A/ Balanced 
Deliberation 
N/A/ N/A/ N/A/ 
Note. Positive (or negative) signs denote that a predictor variable has a positive (or negative) influence on a criterion variable over 




Non-partisans: Predicting Diverse Sharing on Social Media 
 
 Diversity Values  Diverse Exposure  Diverse Exposure  Diverse Sharing 
Motivation N/A/ Defensive 
Dismissal 
N/A/ 
Opportunity Strong busyness (-) Strong habitual news use (-) Defensive Deliberation 
N/A/ 
Ability N/A/ Balanced 
Deliberation 
N/A/ 
Note. Positive (or negative) signs denote that a predictor variable has a positive (or negative) influence on a criterion variable over 
time among individuals with strong/moderate/weak levels of a given moderator. 
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CHAPTER VII.  
Discussion 
 
Diversity Paradox 1: Explaining the Diversity Deficit 
The first part of this dissertation addresses the first paradox of media diversity: the 
diversity deficit. The diversity deficit refers to the disconnect in the political communication 
literature between values widely ascribed to diversity-seeking (AP v. U.S., 1945; Garrett, 2009a; 
Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015; Mutz, 2006; Napoli, 1999; Obama, 2010; Pariser, 2011; Prior, 
2007; Stroud, 2011; Sunstein, 2009) and people’s rather imbalanced information diets (Iyengar 
& Hahn, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012; Stroud, 2011). By empirically 
explaining the disconnect, this dissertation advances our theoretical understanding of diversity 
norms. Specifically, I apply the theoretical framework of MOA (Motivation, Opportunity and 
Ability, Delli Carpini, 2000) to investigate the possibility that individuals with certain resources 
can better translate their diversity values into diverse exposure in the context of mass media as 
well as social media. Furthermore, this dissertation examines whether individuals’ strength of 
party affiliation makes a difference in their translation of diversity values into diverse exposure 
in the broad context of the Social Identity Theory (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979).  
Findings from this dissertation demonstrate that while holding diversity values is 
important in diverse exposure at a later time, having the right opportunities (habitual news use) 
and ability (diversity-seeking skill) also helps individuals translate their values into diverse 
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exposure in the contexts of both mass media and social media. Individuals can better actualize 
their diversity values into their news consumption habits if they are confident about their skills to 
navigate the media environment and find sources that present diverse viewpoints. Also, 
individuals who habitually consume news can better-translate their diversity values into diverse 
exposure. In the social media context, although diversity values did not directly influence diverse 
exposure in social media, political interest appeared as a significant moderator. Having the right 
motivation (i.e., political interest) helps individuals actualize their values into diverse exposure 
on social media by following information sources.  
Analyses in the context of social media also revealed important differences between 
diverse exposure (a) from followed sources and (b) from individuals in one’s network. People 
can “pull” certain information sources including news media, journalists, and politicians, 
whereas they can also be “pushed” to content posted or shared by individuals in their social 
network (Hargittai et al., 2012; Neuman, 2016). Diverse exposure from followed sources tends to 
be intentional exposure while diverse exposure from individuals in one’s network tends to be 
rather incidental (Brundidge, 2010; Kim, 2011). Although only one moderator—habitual news 
use—was found significant in predicting diverse exposure from individuals in one’s network, all 
three moderators (pertaining to motivation, opportunity and ability) were significant in predicting 
diverse exposure from followed sources. Perhaps people with more resource can do a better job 
of consuming diverse viewpoints on social media if they wish to, by “pulling” sources on their 
own.  
Exposure to news and political viewpoints from individuals in a user’s social media 
network, however, depends on what his/her network share, meaning that the user has little 
control over it. When it comes to the content people can get from individuals in their network, 
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they can theoretically be exposed to political differences and novel perspectives. This is because 
not only can people connect with weak-ties who do not necessarily share geographical location, 
social experiences or political viewpoints with them, but they can also form new relationships 
with others based on shared interests (Brundidge, 2010; Ellison & boyd, 2013). Furthermore, 
certain affordances of social media, such as hashtags and social endorsement cues, allow people 
to be exposed to cross-cutting viewpoints easily (Conover, Ratkiewicz, Francisco, Gonçalves, 
Menczer, & Flammini, 2011; Messing & Westwood, 2014). However, recent evidence indicates 
that this kind of exposure from individuals in one’s network is slightly less diverse due to 
algorithmic curation (e.g., Bakshy et al., 2015). Or it may be that many people end up not 
vocally posting news or political viewpoints of their own, because they care about their self-
presentation and do not wish to be associated with rants and harmful disagreements (e.g., Vraga, 
Thorson, Kligler-Vilenchik, & Gee, 2015). Many social media users choose to disclose 
information and viewpoints that are not upsetting but appropriate for all individuals in their 
network (Ellison, Vitak, Steinfield, Gray, & Lampe, 2011; Hogan, 2010), which may exclude 
vocal political content. If so, users will be presented with less diverse viewpoints on their social 
media, meaning that they are left with less wiggle room where they can make use of resource to 
actualize their diversity values in diverse exposure from individuals in their network social 
media. These, however, are speculations which will merit further empirical investigation. 
Sub-group analyses in the context of both overall media and social media revealed that it 
is mostly partisans—not weak or non-partisans—who benefit from high levels of diversity-skills 
and habitual news use. Partisans seem to make use of the resource to match their diversity values 
with their diverse exposure. It may be that for anyone to actually make use of their resource in 
order to live up to their news values in their practices, they first need the motivation: news, 
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politics and the election have to be important to them. Partisans likely already have this 
motivation, for their political self-identity is important (Greene, 2004), especially in the context 
of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In line with this speculation, this study’s sub-
group analyses showed that only among the non-partisan group, did those who were highly busy 
fail to match their diversity values into diverse exposure on social media. Perhaps for non-
partisans, news and politics took a back seat, as they became busier, thereby demonstrating a 
weaker relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social media. 
One surprise finding is that habitual news use appears to serve as an opportunity, rather 
than a restraint on opportunities, for diverse exposure. Of course, how diverse one’s news diet is 
and what constitutes one’s news habits will depend on each individual, and this dissertation’s 
habitual news use measures the intensity of news habits, rather than the content of news habits. 
The habitual news use measures used in this dissertation is robust in that they are in line with the 
established conceptualization of media habits, tapping the extent to which people get news 
automatically, unconsciously and without thinking (LaRose, 2010; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). 
The measures, nonetheless, may somewhat overlap with people’s overall news use. In fact, 
habitual news use was moderately correlated with overall news use (r=.49, p<.01) in wave 1.   
Given the important role habitual news use plays in predicting diverse exposure, it may be 
beneficial to conduct more in-depth research on the content of people’s news habits and devise 
an improved measure tapping diverse news habits—the degree to which people habitually get 
diverse news. It would be essential to consider the different contexts in which people form news 
habits. Social media is one context though there are two ways of consuming news via social 
media. Users can rather incidentally engage with news shared by individuals in their social 
media network or actively follow news sources. If certain users follow a number of news sources 
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that present diverse viewpoints, then they may have a better chance of forming diverse news 
habits.  
Along this line of research on diverse news habits, this dissertation’s sub-group analyses 
among partisans may shed some light. Specifically, partisans who more habitually consume news 
do a better job of matching their diversity values with diverse exposure in both mass and social 
media whereas non-partisans with strong habitual news use do a worse job. Compared to non-
partisans, partisans may have news habits that expose themselves to more diverse viewpoints. 
Although this may appear counter-intuitive at first glance, this is in line with a number of studies 
demonstrating that partisans do not avoid opposing views (Chaffee, Saphir, Graf, Sandvig, & 
Hahn, 2001; Garrett, 2009a; Garrett, Carnahan, & Lynch, 2013), and sometimes they even seek 
out opposing views (Weeks et al., 2016; Jang, 2013). Partisans tend to be interested in 
understanding (and possibly counter-arguing) their opponents’ arguments (Neuman, 2016; 
Neuman, Bimber, & Hindman, 2011) in addition to following hard news reporting (Prior, 2003). 
If partisans indeed habitually engage in diverse exposure on social media, they likely train 
algorithms to amplify diverse political content on social media feeds (Bakshy et al., 2015). 
Partisan users who highly value diversity will then be able to actually consume diverse 
viewpoints on their social media feeds. This scenario is in line with this dissertation’s findings. 
Nonetheless, considering that this dissertation’s news habit measure is self-reported, 
relying on respondents’ perceptions, it cannot exclude the possibility that partisans, compared to 
weak or non-partisans, are more sensitive to ideological diversity in media and messages in 
general rather than habitually engage in more diverse exposure. It may be worthwhile to conduct 
future research on news habits, using experiments or web log data where the content of 
respondents’ news habits can be better quantified. Still, the findings from the current study hold 
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important implications for interventions to improve individuals’ media diets. For example, civic 
education programs may look for ways to develop people’s media literacy and diversity-seeking 
skills as well as their news habits (see Munson, Lee, & Resnick, 2013; Park, Kang, Chung, & 
Song, 2009). This will help individuals diversify their news media diets and live up to their 
diversity values in line with the normative claims put forward by democratic theory. 
 
Diversity Paradox 2: Explaining the Mixed Effects of Diversity Exposure on Citizenship 
The second part of this dissertation addresses the second paradox of media diversity: the 
mixed effects of diverse exposure on democratic citizenship. This dissertation advances our 
theoretical understanding of diversity norms by explaining the mixed effects of diverse exposure 
on democratic citizenship with different motivations for cross-cutting exposure. Although 
scholars consider it important for individuals to consume diverse information and viewpoints to 
become citizens who are politically informed, engaged and capable of deliberation, the empirical 
evidence accumulated so far casts some doubt on the presumed relationship (e.g., Mutz, 2006; 
Stroud, 2011). That is, individuals who consume news from diverse viewpoints may not 
uniformly garner democratic benefits by becoming more politically informed, engaged and 
capable of deliberation. Drawing from the theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Taber & 
Lodge, 2006), the current study empirically examines the possibility that different motivations 
behind diverse exposure moderate the relationship between diverse exposure and citizenship 
indicators such as political knowledge, political participation and cross-cutting discussion.  
First, this dissertation expands on the theory of motivated reasoning by demonstrating 
that there are three distinct motivations for exposure to news from cross-cutting viewpoints: 
defensive dismissal, defensive deliberation and balanced deliberation. That is, people choose to 
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engage in cross-cutting exposure with different motivations. Some people with defensive 
dismissal motivations expose themselves to news from viewpoints that oppose their own just to 
maintain their political views by readily disregarding opposing viewpoints. Other people with 
defensive deliberation motivations consume news from opposing viewpoints in an effort to 
strengthen their existing views by counter-arguing the arguments of the opposing side. Yet, other 
people with balanced deliberation motivations engage in cross-cutting exposure to form an 
accurate or well-informed position by learning the strengths of viewpoints that oppose their own. 
These motivations for cross-cutting exposure were distinct in that they were uniquely predicted 
with demographic, political and news media use factors.  
Furthermore, the findings of the present study suggest the importance of different 
motivations for exposure to diverse viewpoints—rather than mere exposure—in predicting 
democratic citizenship indicators. That is, the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure 
moderated the relationship between diverse exposure and citizenship indicators, including 
political knowledge, political participation and cross-cutting discussion.  
 
Political knowledge. When it comes to predicting political knowledge, diverse exposure 
demonstrated a negative relationship among individuals with strong defensive motivations, both 
defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation. Perhaps, diverse exposure with defensive 
motivations—to maintain or strengthen existing viewpoints—is not helpful in being politically 
informed. For instance, because individuals with high defensive dismissal motivations tend to 
not give serious consideration to news from opposing viewpoints, they will likely not take 
advantage of the opportunity to learn from the opposing side (Gaines et al., 2007; Lavine, 
Johnson, & Steenbergen, 2012). Individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations tend to 
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engage in biased information processing, looking for weaknesses in arguments of opposing 
viewpoints while acquiring strengths in arguments of their own political views (Druckman, 
2012; Redlawsk, 2002; Taber & Lodge, 2006). These individuals may learn information that is 
favorable to their own views, but misinterpret and neglect information from the opposing side.  
In opposition to theoretical and normative expectations, among individuals with strong 
balanced deliberation motivations, diverse exposure demonstrated a negative relationship with 
political knowledge. Considering that the partisan media of different slants tend to present 
conflicting facts and viewpoints (Dilliplane, 2011; Jamieson & Cappella, 2008), individuals may 
end up being confused after trying to process such conflicting messages in an even-handed way. 
In the end, they may become less political knowledgeable. One additional surprise finding is that 
diverse exposure also demonstrated a positive relationship among a small group of individuals 
with extremely weak deliberation motivations, including both defensive deliberation and 
balanced deliberation. Although it is a norm, deliberation of diverse and possibly conflicting 
ideas and pieces of information, including those from opposing sides, may actually do more 
harm than good for ordinary citizens when it comes to political learning. Nonetheless, it is worth 
noting who these two groups of people are. Those with higher levels of defensive deliberation 
and balanced deliberation motivations tend to be younger people, who are yet to be politically 
sophisticated, interested and knowledgeable (Norris, 2000). Also, those with strong balanced 
deliberation motivations are still not affiliated with a political party. It is possible that these 
young, less partisan individuals with deliberation motivations are in a trial and error phase when 
it comes to processing political information and learning. Perhaps, they are not yet in the 
“virtuous cycle” where politically interested individuals gain political knowledge and 
subsequently become more politically interested and knowledgeable (Norris, 2000). If these 
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young people continue to practice processing diverse viewpoints with balanced deliberation 
motivations, they might become more politically knowledgeable. This possibility that people 
with balanced deliberation motivations actually reap the democratic benefit as normatively 
expected will merit empirical investigation over an extended period of time. 
 
Political participation. In predicting political participation, diverse exposure 
demonstrated a positive relationship among individuals with moderate or strong defensive 
motivations, both defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation. On one hand, individuals with 
high defensive dismissal motivations likely bolster their existing views by readily disregarding 
arguments from opposing views; accordingly, these individuals demonstrate higher levels of 
political participation (Lavine, Johnson, & Steenbergen, 2012; Mutz, 2002a). On the other hand, 
individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations counter-argue opposing viewpoints, 
which may help them to confidently participate in politics to have their voices heard (Muffert et 
al., 2006).  
Among individuals with high balanced deliberation motivations, in opposition to the 
hypothesis, diverse exposure positively predicted political participation. Given that the degree to 
which individuals are certain and confident about their positions is related to their willingness to 
participate in politics (e.g., Lavine et al., 2012), findings from the current study imply that those 
with strong balanced deliberation motivations solidify their views and become polarized, rather 
than modify their existing views, after diverse exposure (c.f. Lee, Choi, Kim, & Kim, 2014).6 
Although these individuals have reported their motivations to be deliberate on diverse viewpoints 
in a fair and balanced way, they might end up scrutinizing the arguments of “the other side” in 
                                                 
6 People with more diverse network on social media became more polarized if they engaged in more political 
discussion (Lee et al., 2014). 
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favor of their side. In support of this speculation, there is experimental evidence indicating that 
even when participants are induced with “accuracy” motivations, many of them still process 
diverse information in a defensive way (e.g., Winter, Metzger, & Flanagin, 2016). For this line of 
inquiry, the current study’s subgroup analyses might also provide some support, because it was 
the partisan group who demonstrated that balanced deliberation motivations interacted with 
diverse exposure to positively predict political participation. For partisans, it must have been 
challenging to stay balanced when exposed to diverse viewpoints, especially in the context of the 
2016 presidential election, a particularly polarizing campaign with the “two most unpopular 
major-party presidential nominees in polling history” (Walsh, 2016). 
It is possible that these partisans with strong balanced deliberation motivations, despite 
their motivations, may (subconsciously) assign undue weight to pro-attitudinal messages, 
essentially defensively deliberating on diverse viewpoints. This speculation finds some support 
from this study’s pilot dataset. When asked about how respondents feel about and react to news 
stories from political views that oppose their own, a few expressed their failure to actually 
process news stories that opposed their political view in a balanced way. For example, one 
respondent wrote, “I try to read them, and will fight to focus on trying to understand their 
perspective -- but I often fall short of that goal and get angry or dismiss the article” while another 
respondent confessed “[I] try to see their side of it, but usually make dumb faces because I can’t 
wrap my head around their logic.”  
One potential mechanism at work involves message or source credibility where people 
perceive pro-attitudinal messages as being more credible than balanced or counter-attitudinal 
ones (Metzger, Hartsell, & Flanagin, 2015). Despite balanced deliberation motivations, after 
diverse exposure, people may perceive viewpoints in line with theirs as being more credible, and 
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solidify their existing views, becoming more politically participatory thereby. It would be 
worthwhile to empirically test this possibility and clarify the mechanisms in experimental 
studies. This would be an especially important subject considering the recent prevalence and 
popularity of fake news or “distorted signals uncorrelated with the truth” (Allcott & Gentzkow, 
2017, p. 212). In the 2016 presidential election, fake news stories were more extensively shared 
on social media than news from mainstream media, and many people who were exposed to the 
fake news reported that they believed it (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). These individuals might 
have believed fake news, perhaps perceiving it as credible, regardless of the source’s actual 
credibility, because it reinforced their existing political views. This possibility would merit 
further empirical examination. 
 
Cross-cutting discussion. When it comes to predicting cross-cutting discussion, diverse 
exposure demonstrated a positive relationship only among individuals with strong balanced 
deliberation motivations. Individuals with high balanced deliberation motivations will process 
information from different perspectives in an even-minded manner, learning the merits and 
strong parts of opposing views (cf. “people with a civil orientation toward conflict” in Mutz, 
2002a). In the process, they will likely develop deliberative capacity while learning the value of 
engaging with the opposing side. Accordingly, these individuals with high balanced deliberation 
motivations may more frequently engage in cross-cutting discussion with more diverse exposure. 
However, individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations, upon encountering more 
diverse views, may feel like they have already counter-argued the arguments of opposing views 
(Druckman, 2012; Taber & Lodge, 2006). They may end up seeing less value in listening to the 
opposing side. Individuals with high defensive dismissal motivations, do not substantively 
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engage with opposing views upon encountering them. They will likely laugh at and readily 
dismiss opposing views, not seeing at all the value of listening to individuals whose views 
oppose their own views thereby. 
Interestingly, sub-group analyses have revealed that among partisans, diverse exposure 
interact with all three motivations to positively predict cross-cutting discussion. This finding is 
encouraging in that the deliberative outcome (i.e., cross-cutting discussion) was facilitated 
through diverse exposure among a wider group of partisans; regardless of what motivated these 
partisans to be exposed to diverse viewpoints, they talk more about politics with the opposing 
side after diverse exposure. However, it is possible that partisans who consume opposing views 
with different motivations engage in cross-cutting discussion, again with different motivations. 
For example, partisans who are primarily motivated to defensively dismiss opposing views may 
have very different cross-cutting discussion than other partisans with balanced deliberation 
motivations. Although the current dataset does not address the content of cross-cutting 
discussion or the degree to which such discussion is deliberative, it would be worth investigating 
not just the frequency, but also the quality of cross-cutting discussion. In this line of future 
research, prior scholarship on citizen deliberation and the public sphere would provide a helpful 
guidance. For example, drawing from Habermas’ ideal speech situation, Neuman and colleagues 
(2011) identified criteria for successful deliberation in an online public sphere including the 
capacity for collective will formation along with discursive equality and reciprocal respect. 
Cross-cutting discussion will be of little democratic value if participants do not attend to the 
conversations (Kwak, Williams, Wang, & Lee, 2005) or offer comments that are mindless, close-
minded or impolite (Neuman et al., 2011). Considering the quality of cross-cutting discussion in 
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future research would help us better understand how diverse exposure, in interaction with 
different motivations for cross-cutting exposure, benefits individuals with deliberative outcomes. 
 
Diverse Sharing on Social Media. In the context of social media, this dissertation 
considers diverse sharing by drawing from the prior literature on “news sharing” as an 
expressive form of political participation (e.g., Hasell & Weeks, 2016; Lane, Kim, Lee, Weeks, 
& Kwak, 2017; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). The results demonstrate that 
individuals who consume more news from diverse viewpoints on social media actually share 
more diverse news. Furthermore, with more diverse exposure, individuals with strong defensive 
motivations (both defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation) share even more diverse news 
stories. Although sharing news about politics and the election on social media is known to be 
easy and effortless (Kümpel et al., 2015), it carries elements of expression and endorsement that 
is rather public (Bode, Vraga, Borah, & Shah, 2014). What individuals share will be visible to 
other people in one’s social network. Due to this public characteristic of sharing, diverse sharing 
on social media has the potential to pose threats to harmonious social relationships (see Mutz, 
2002b, 2006). Some social media users may refrain from sharing vocal political content in case it 
upsets some individuals in their network (“the imagined audience”) while only sharing content 
that is seemingly appropriate for everybody (Ellison, Vitak, Steinfield, Gray, & Lampe, 2011; 
Hogan, 2010; Marwick & boyd, 2011). People with strong balanced deliberation motivations 
may be especially susceptible to this, because they will likely be familiar with the pros and cons 
of diverse viewpoints (see also Vraga et al., 2015).  
Those with strong defensive motivations, however, may not be hesitant to publicly 
express themselves about political issues publicly on social media. Even after becoming more 
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aware of diverse viewpoints on social media, these defensively motivated individuals will likely 
find viewpoints in line with their own more valid, only becoming more committed to and certain 
about their political party or view. Thus, it is possible that these defensive individuals not only 
share like-minded news in a favorable light, but also share news from opposing views rather 
sarcastically or critically in an effort to advance their agenda (Coppini et al., 2017). However, the 
current dataset does not contain evidence for this speculation, although the pilot dataset provides 
anecdotal evidence. When asked about how respondents would feel or react to a news story from 
political viewpoints that opposed theirs, one respondent with defensive motivations mentioned, 
“sometimes I post it to social media with my comments; often I am displeased.” While this is 
notable considering that the question did not explicitly ask about their reaction on social media, it 
is possible that this “displeased” respondent posts news stories from opposing viewpoints with a 
negative comment. Comments made and emotions felt while sharing news stories will be 
important in future research on diverse sharing; researchers can collect, for example, comments 
individuals leave when sharing news stories from diverse perspectives or ask people to report on 
their emotion at the moment of sharing. Perhaps a mixed method project combining social media 
log analyses with an online survey would be ideal (e.g., Dvir-Gvirsman, Tsfati, & Menchen-
Trevino, 2016). 
 
Taken together, an interesting divide emerges between diverse exposure’s respective 
relationships with political knowledge and participation. That is, individuals who are most 
politically informed are not necessarily the most active participants in politics, and vice versa 
(Lavine, Johnson, and Steenbergen, 2012; Mutz, 2006). For instance, for partisans with strong 
motivations—whether they be defensive, balanced, deliberative or dismissive—diverse exposure 
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appeared positively related to political participation, although it was found to be negatively 
related to political knowledge. On the other hand, partisans with extremely weak deliberation 
motivations became more politically knowledgeable, but no more participatory, with more 
diverse exposure. While this study demonstrated that diverse exposure and democratic benefits 
do not necessarily go hand-in-hand, normative questions remain as to whether it is problematic 
that those who participate in politics are not necessarily well-informed, and that over time 
democratic changes in citizens are not entirely in line with the expectations put forward by 
democratic theory. 
It is also worth noting that findings regarding balanced deliberation motivations were not 
fully in line with normative and theoretical expectations. Although theoretically individuals with 
high balanced deliberation motivations are expected to demonstrate a positive relationship 
between diverse exposure and political knowledge, the relationship was in an opposite direction. 
Also, these individuals with high balanced deliberation motivations may be expected to 
demonstrate a negative relationship between diverse exposure and political participation, since 
they may be politically ambivalent due to their familiarity with the strengths of views that 
oppose their own. However, among these individuals, a positive relationship was found between 
diverse exposure and political participation. Despite normative and theoretical expectations 
about ideal citizens, it may be rather difficult for ordinary individuals to maintain this balanced 
deliberation motivation when encountering opposing viewpoints. However, in line with 
theoretical as well as normative expectations, individuals with high balanced deliberation 
motivations did appear to engage in more cross-cutting discussion with more diverse exposure. It 
is possible that these individuals who are highly motivated to deliberate in a balanced way, 
compared to those with high defensive motivations, garner primarily deliberative benefits 
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through diverse exposure. In future research, it would be worthwhile to examine whether diverse 
exposure indeed more positively predicts other deliberative outcomes, such as awareness of 
arguments for opposing views and political tolerance, along with the abovementioned quality of 
cross-cutting discussion, among individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivations.   
 Future research expanding on these motivations for cross-cutting exposure may also 
benefit from more accurate measures. As noted above, in predicting political knowledge and 
participation, the three motivations functioned similarly, in contrary to theoretical expectations. 
This might have in part resulted from the fact that conceptually, the three motivations share 
overlapping psychological components. Specifically, the three motivations conceptually each 
contain two psychological components (e.g., defense and deliberation for defensive deliberation 
motivations), one or two of which are shared with other motivations. One way to improve the 
motivation measures used in this dissertation7 may involve a more granular approach where two 
psychological components of a given motivation are separately measured and then combined. 
This would require a development of four measures of defense, balance, dismissal, and 
deliberation mechanisms. Using these four measures, we would be able to have more accurate 
operationalization of the three motivations.  
Assuming that defense is the opposite of balance and dismissal is opposite to deliberation 
on a spectrum, people may be plotted onto the graph in Figure 7-1, depending on their responses 
to four measures.8 Respondents may then be categorized into one of the three groups, 
characterized with defensive dismissal, defensive deliberation, or balanced deliberation 
motivations. The question remains whether a group with balanced dismissal motivations actually 
emerges. Additionally, there may be another group of people who do not score high on any of 
                                                 
7 Another way may involve scale-building or ipsatization, using this study’s measures. 
8 If so, researchers may need only two measures, instead of four. 
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the measures. These people are possibly those who are not motivated for cross-cutting exposure 
themselves, yet are still exposed to counter-attitudinal viewpoints. One feasible scenario is that 
this group is somehow incidentally exposed to opposing views. If this group with no motivations 
actually emerges, it may be interesting to examine the relationship between diverse exposure and 
democratic outcomes among this group. Upon unexpected encounter with cross-cutting views, 
maybe they process them properly, and be further informed and engaged. This line of speculation 
would merit future investigation.  
 
Figure 7-1. 
Typology of People by Components behind Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure 
 
 
Findings from this study seek to contribute to and potentially challenge the popular 
negative narrative around partisans. Partisans are often criticized in that they are not willing to 
compromise with the opposing side, making politics dysfunctional (Abramowitz, 2013). Sub-
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group analyses of this dissertation, however, demonstrate that partisans function as good 
democratic citizens in a few notable aspects. Partisans tend to match their diversity values with 
diverse exposure in their everyday lives by making use of their resources. When partisans do 
engage in diverse exposure, regardless of what motivations they hold for cross-cutting exposure, 
they appear to garner greater democratic benefits—they discuss politics more frequently with the 
opposing side and participate more in the political process, compared to weak or non-partisans. 
Perhaps for anyone to actualize their professed diversity values and to reap democratic outcomes 
that are normatively expected from diverse exposure, politics has to be important to them. For 
partisans, political matters are important. Political self-identity is essential to them, as argued in 
the broad context of social identity theory (Green et al., 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In future 
research in this vein, it would be important to consider whether Republicans and Democrats (or 
conservatives and liberals) demonstrate different patterns. This is a plausible path that is worth 
exploring, given the psychological and behavioral differences between different partisan groups, 
especially as regards involving selectivity (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; 
Garrett, 2009b; Garrett & Stroud, 2014; Jost, 2017), although some studies argued otherwise 
(Iyengar & Hahn, 2009, Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009). 
This dissertation is limited in a few ways. First of all, the measures used in this study 
relied on self-reported data. Due to respondents’ imperfect recall, self-reported measures of 
media use might not be the best measures (Neuman, 2016; Prior, 2009). Also, some of this 
study’s psychological and behavioral measures involved societal norms (e.g., diversity values, 
diverse exposure, and balanced deliberation motivations for cross-cutting exposure), leaving 
room for a social desirability bias and potential inflation of these measures. Second, because this 
study relied on a two-wave survey, it was only able to examine changes in diverse exposure and 
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changes in citizenship indicators over time in the separate models. It would be worthwhile to 
collect more longitudinal data and test a moderated mediation model of diversity values, diverse 
exposure and citizenship indicators. Third, datasets for this dissertation were collected during the 
2016 presidential campaign, a particularly polarizing one with the “two most unpopular major-
party presidential nominees in polling history” (Walsh, 2016). During the campaign, some 
people may have failed to enact their diversity values when consuming news although they 
would normally do so. The peculiarity of this election, however, may have only muddied the 
relationships between diversity values and diverse exposure or relationships among diverse 
exposure, motivations for cross-cutting exposure and democratic citizenship, which would not 
hurt the solidity of the findings. Lastly, this study relied on a non-probability sample from 
internet-based panels, limiting the generalizability of the findings to a wider population (c.f. 
Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012). This holds true although age, gender and education quotas were 
applied in an effort to ensure that this study’s sample closely resembles the American population.  
Given the limitations of this study, future researchers are encouraged to replicate the 
findings of the current study using data from a probability sample collected in non-election 
seasons or during the next election campaign. Also, self-reported survey measures can be 
corroborated with other data sets, including actual web log data of media use9 (e.g., Dvir-
Gvirsman et al., 2016) or behavioral data from experiments. Continued investigation of the 
relationship between diverse exposure and democratic citizenship along with people’s diversity 
values, motivations for cross-cutting exposure, and strength of party affiliation will help advance 
                                                 
9 Using web log data or social media log data, researchers may devise more granular media use measures. For 
instance, on social media, users who get news once a day or a few times a day can be distinguished from those who 
get news multiple times a day, as opposed to the approach the current study takes, which is, having one group of 
users who get news from social media on a daily basis. 
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a more comprehensive theoretical and normative understanding of what constitutes ideal citizens 
in a democratic society.  
This dissertation makes theoretical, methodological and practical contributions in the 
following ways. Theoretically, I identified and explained two paradoxes in media diversity 
norms by drawing from the framework of motivation, opportunity and ability (Delli Carpini, 
2000) and the theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Notably, I 
proposed and demonstrated three distinct motivations for cross-cutting exposure—defensive 
dismissal, defensive deliberation, and balanced deliberation. Methods-wise, I devised and 
validated original survey measures, examples of which include the three motivations for cross-
cutting exposure along with diverse exposure and diverse news sharing on social media, applying 
normalized Shannon’s H Information Entropy (Boydstun et al., 2014). By using two-wave panel 
survey data, I clarified the assumed causal path from diversity values to diverse exposure and 
democratic citizenship, which in large part was based on norms and cross-sectional evidence.  
The findings of this dissertation also hold practical implications for civic education, 
media diversity policies, and strategies in the news industry. In designing civic education 
programs and interventions to improve people’s information diets, it would be vital to consider 
their news media literacy, diversity-seeking skills and news habits in today’s media environment. 
In such an evolving environment, not only can people seamlessly get news from a myriad of 
media outlets on a smartphone, but also they can create, share and distribute news stories on 
social media. People may no longer sympathize with the legal division among public 
broadcasting, cable communications, and the Internet and other interactive computer services in 
the Communications Act of 1934. For better policies on media diversity, there needs to be more 
discussion about a holistic, audience-centered approach (Napoli, 1997; also see Kim, 2016), 
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which would allow a more comprehensive understanding of how people navigate and contribute 
to today’s information environment. Empirical evidence collected with an audience-centered 
approach may provide insight into designing media diversity policies to achieve one of the legal 
goals for the internet and other interactive computer services—to offer “a forum for a true 
diversity of political discourse” (§ 230. (3)). Finally, in developing strategies in the news 
industry, decision-makers may utilize the results of this dissertation—for example, on people’s 
news values. For business purposes, brand marketers may emphasize the diverse perspectives 
covered in their news outlet, because overall, people preferred diverse news over most other 
news values. Also, social media marketers may somehow find the result that social media users 
with primarily defensive motivations for cross-cutting exposure end up sharing more diverse 
content that they consume helpful in writing headlines or promoting certain news stories on their 
social media channels. I, however, hope that other findings on the democratic outcomes of 
diversity-seeking and deliberation, which are somewhat disconnected from the societal norms, 
can also draw the attention of the news industry. It is hoped that this dissertation provokes 
thoughts among different players in the news industry as they write and distribute news stories, 
about the ways in which they can work with policymakers and audiences in building a news 
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